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ABSTRACT 
A new government gives room for new ideas and the implementation of these. In the case of public 
private partnerships, it is more that the government is brushing of the dust from something the same 
governing party (The Conservative party, Høyre) started the last time they had governing power in 
Norway. In 1998, they started three trial PPP projects in road infrastructure. This is some years ago, 
and with the rejuvenated focus on PPP, it would be wise to see how the three first projects faired 
compared to the more traditional way of organising the construction of roads in Norway.  
A key characteristic of public-private partnerships is that the two tasks of building a facility and 
subsequently operating it are bundled and delegated to a single private contractor, while under 
traditional procurement, separate contractors are in charge of these two tasks. This thesis seeks to find 
what contracts and financing possibilities there are, as well have a look at what the different types 
offer. The aim is to find out whether it is possible to use the market even better in order to find a 
solution to build roads with a span longer than the finalisation of the road. By that, the meaning is 
taking the operation of the road into account.  
In order to answer these challenges, the aim of this thesis seek to:  
(1) Create an overview over contract details in the three existing Norwegian PPP projects and 
compare it to the traditional contract formulation regarding both construction and later 
operation of the road. The aim is to find a way to describe the governance and payment 
scheme for PPP compared to traditional contracts. 
(2) Consider factors that influences the LCC in the PPP contract E39 Klett-Bårdshaug, and 
evaluate findings with traditional construction and operation contracts. 
(3) If possible, find a conceptual estimate for the LCC at E39 Klett-Bårdshaug, compared to LCC 
for similar road elements (road in the day, bridge, and tunnel) from traditional road 
construction contracts regarding both construction and operation.   
When looking at what elements in the PPP project E39 Klett-Bårdshaug that effect the LCC, several 
factors that can be hard to transfer to traditional contract forms is identified, including total enterprises 
such as the road development contract. The payment model and scheme is something you only get 
with a PPP project. The findings shows that it is reasonable to attribute many of the positive sides of 
PPP to the payment scheme, but also most of the negative sides. The road development contract tries 
to implement some of the positive sides, and the results of the test project in E6 Helgeland will show 
the output. 
There are clear differences between the PPP contract used in Norway, and the examples being used as 
a deterrent against using it. The finance and payment profile in the Norwegian contract will not be 
affected in the same way by the financial crisis as in other countries. In other countries, the reduced 
traffic amount due to the crisis lead to the need for governmental support in order to keep the projects 
going. Some of these projects have changed to a payment scheme more similar to the Norwegian one, 
where the toll income goes to the Government, which in turn pays out the money from the toll stations 
and ads over the budget if the tolls does not cover the needed payment sum. 
Getting relevant figures from the PPP projects turned out to be hard, the same when it came to similar 
traditional construction and maintenance projects. A report containing general maintenance and 
construction figures was acquired, which made it possible to do an estimate of what the maintenance 
costs of the PPP project would be if it were a traditional maintenance contract. The conceptual 
estimate show maintenance costs for the road according to NPRA standards. Through analysis of the 
traffic, an alternative way of measuring the traffic is also presented. 
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SAMMENDRAG 
Med en ny regjering kommer det nye ideer og andre metoder for å gjennomføre disse ideene, slik som 
offentlig-privat samarbeid (OPS). For å presisere, er det heller at regjeringen pusser av støvet fra noe 
det samme Høyre startet sist gang de hadde regjeringsmakt i Norge. I 1998 vedtok de å startet de tre 
OPS-prøveprosjekter innen vei som vi kjenner i dag. Dette er noen år siden, og med fornyet fokus på 
OPS er det klokt å se hvordan de tre første prosjektene gjorde det i forhold til den mer tradisjonelle 
måten å organisere bygging av veier i Norge. 
Et sentralt kjennetegn ved OPS er at oppgavene med å bygge et anlegg, og deretter drifte og 
vedlikeholde det, er samlet og delegert til en privat entreprenør, mens under tradisjonelle innkjøp vil 
prosjektet deles opp i separate kontrakter for byggefasen, drift og vedlikehold. Denne oppgaven søker 
å finne ut hvilke kontrakter og finansieringsmuligheter som finnes, samt ta en titt på hva de 
forskjellige typene har å tilby. Målet er å finne ut om det er mulig å bruke markedet enda bedre for å 
finne en løsning for å bygge veier med en lengre varighet på kontrakten enn bare frem til ferdigstillelse 
av byggingen. Tanken er da å ta driften og vedlikeholdet av veien med i betraktningen. 
For å svare på disse utfordringene, er søker denne avhandlingen nå målet ved å: 
(1) Lage en oversikt over kontraktsbestemmelser og detaljer i de tre eksisterende norske OPS-
prosjektene, og sammenligne de med de mer tradisjonelle kontraktstypene for både bygging, 
vedlikehold og drift av veier. Målet er å finne en måte å beskrive styring og 
betalingsordningen for OPS sammenlignet med tradisjonelle kontrakter. 
(2) Vurdere faktorer som påvirker livssykluskostnadene i OPS-kontrakten E39 Klett - Bårdshaug, 
og vurdere funnene opp mot tradisjonelle bygge og driftskontrakter. 
(3) Hvis mulig, finne et konseptuelt estimat for livsløpskostnader på E39 Klett - Bårdshaug, 
sammenlignet med livsløpskostnader for lignende veielementer (veg i dagen, bro og tunnel) 
fra tradisjonelle veiutbyggingskontrakter og drift- og vedlikeholdskontrakter. 
Når man ser på hvilke elementer i OPS-prosjektet E39 Klett - Bårdshaug som påvirker 
livsløpskostnader, er flere faktorer som kan være vanskelig å overføre til tradisjonelle entrepriseformer 
identifisert, herunder totale entrepriser som for eksempel veien utviklingskontrakten. 
Finansieringsmodellen er noe man bare får med et OPS-prosjekt. Våre resultater viser at det er rimelig 
å tilskrive mange av de positive sider ved OPS til finansieringsordningen, men også mesteparten av de 
negative sidene. Vegutviklingskontrakten forsøker å implementere noen av de positive sidene av OPS, 
og resultatet av testprosjektet på E6 Helgeland vil vise resultatet av dette. 
Det er klare forskjeller mellom OPS-kontrakten som brukes i Norge, og eksemplene blir brukt for å 
avskrekke de som vil bruke OPS. Finansierings- og betalingsprofilen i den norske kontrakten vil ikke 
bli påvirket på samme måte av finanskrisen som i andre land. I andre land, resulterte redusert 
trafikkmengde på grunn av krisen til et behov for statlig støtte for å holde prosjektene i gang. Noen av 
disse prosjektene har byttet til en betalingsordning mer lik den norske, der bompenge inntektene går til 
staten, som igjen betaler ut pengene fra bomstasjonene og supplerer dette med bevilger over 
statsbudsjettet hvis bompengene ikke dekker nødvendige kontraktssum. 
Å få relevante tall fra OPS-prosjektene viste seg å være vanskelig, det samme gjelder det å få relevante 
tall fra lignende tradisjonelle bygge og vedlikeholdsprosjekter. En rapport som inneholder generelle 
vedlikeholds -og bygge tall for tradisjonelle kontrakter er det gitt tilgang til, noe som gjorde det mulig 
å gjøre et anslag over hva vedlikeholdskostnadene for OPS-prosjektet ville være hvis det hadde vært 
en tradisjonell vedlikeholdskontrakt. Et konseptuelt estimat viser vedlikeholdskostnader for veien i 
henhold til Statens vegvesens standarder. Gjennom en analyse av trafikkmengde er en alternativ måte 
å måle trafikk og kostnadene til dette også presentert. 
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1 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
It is clear that transport and communication costs is a considerable portion of a country’s budget. In 
the national budget for 2014 (presented by the old government in October 2013), 45,2 billion NOK 
was allocated to transportation matters, which includes rail and road. Comparing these numbers to 
other matters, it is a significant number. For example is the total expenses for the Norwegian defence 
around 45 billion NOK, and education somewhere around 29 billion NOK.  
The importance of having good infrastructure is important. Norway’s closest neighbour, Sweden had 
in 2010 21289 km of highway, while Norway at the same time had 27427 kilometres highway. Taking 
into account that there are living almost twice as many people in Sweden compared to Norway, it is 
clear that road development must stand for a high proportion of the budget. The government also 
states that with the budget allocations for road building in 2013 (when finished), the total meters of 
four-lane highway will be doubled compared to 2005. 
The new government early stated its extra commitment to expanding the development of infrastructure 
in transportation. This is illustrated by the fact that they in the revised budget for 2014 gives an extra 
1,4 billion NOK to roads and railroad, mainly to maintenance costs of old roads and tunnels 
(Regjeringen, 2013b). This new political direction will increase the need for a method of organising 
projects in a way that reduces cost, and raises quality, and that can be unified with the idea behind 
PPP. With this in mind, putting more emphasis on doing a deep analysis of what is contributing to 
more efficient use of these money is important. This thesis seek to contribute to analyse the PPP today 
compared to traditional procurement contracts. 
The new government has intent to establish a company that will be responsible for the building of new 
roads more efficiently. The building of new roads and railroad will be organised in public private 
partnerships (PPP) on a much larger scale than what has been the reality until now. 
«There will be established a development company that will lift several road projects and follow 
through the building more efficient. /Det etableres et eget utbyggingsselskap som skal løfte flere 
veiprosjekter og gjennomføre utbygging mer effektivt..»(Regjeringen, 2013a) 
«Start the work of catching up with the maintenance lag of infrastructure. /Starte arbeidet med å 
innhente vedlikeholdsetterslepet på infrastruktur.» (Regjeringen, 2013a) 
 «Organize larger road and railway developments as own projects where PPP is used as 
implementation strategy. / Organisere større vei- og jernbaneutbygginger som egne prosjekter der 
offentlig-privat samarbeid (OPS) brukes som gjennomføringsstrategi.» (Regjeringen, 2013a) 
The government has also discussed using PPP as strategy for other construction projects, such as 
schools and other public. This project will not put any emphasis into that, because the project group 
found such projects to be successful in the Great Britain, but Norwegian experience on the area is 
more balanced in its praise.  
During the election period in Norway the fall of 2013, there were made several contradicting 
statements about PPP. The Conservative Party (Høyre), which is one of the new governing parties, 
proclaimed that PPP in road projects would help reduce the construction time, and that the projects 
would be cheaper. The losing party, The Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) proclaimed that all experience 
with PPP from other countries has shown that PPP is not cheaper, but more expensive than traditional 
projects. 
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This project seeks to do a comparison between existing PPP projects and traditional procurement 
projects in an attempt to find out if there are any differences. Also finding out if there are differences 
between the Norwegian PPP contracts and the ones used in other countries and try to shed light on 
what the trout actually is when it comes to PPP, and if there are any experiences that one can learn 
from.  
1.1 Finding and developing the problem statement 
 “The master thesis is meant to enable the students to develop deeper knowledge, understanding, 
capabilities and attitudes in the context of the field of study” (Chalmers, 2012), which in the project 
groups case is within project management. This is the purpose of the master thesis, and the aim is to 
find a problem that is suitable to solve in order to prove the capabilities. 
“During the master thesis, the students should develop detailed knowledge about one particular area 
within the main profile area of the student(s)”(NTNU, 2014). As the main profile is industrial 
economics, with focus on public-private procurements, a process similar to a setting that can be faced 
by project managers must be included. A decision making process and a comparison between options 
must also be included. The final problem statement in this thesis suits the specialization course and 
gives suitable challenges in the right areas compared to the subjects chosen during the two years in the 
master degree.  
The background for finding a thesis topic within the segment chosen was the specialization project 
written during the autumn semester of 2013. The specialization project gave us the opportunity to see 
what could be done about the specific theme that was chosen during the summer of 2013, which was 
supplier-buyer relationships in private operation of public services. At that time, the choice was to 
look at public procurement, and the challenges regarding increasing collaboration with the private, as 
more agencies that are public are being privatized. A few industries and business practices was 
investigated, and later a possible problem to research in the master thesis was uncovered. The aim of 
the project was to find out how business practice today look at the LCC of a project.  The questions 
asked was whether the Norwegian regulations regarding public procurement could use LCC as criteria 
in tender competition. Finding out where it was in use today as well as searching to find which 
perceptions there were around the term LCC was also set as a goal. How LCC use today influences 
different businesses, how the Norwegian regulations creates room for the use of LCC and what the 
term really includes was the next step. As the project developed, a collaboration partner for the master 
thesis was found, in the NPRA. Because there already were questions at that time needing answers 
regarding road construction, because of the result in the recent elections and their vision on developing 
infrastructure, that was used as one of the businesses to investigate. In the project, there was presented 
many interesting findings regarding how money was spent on such projects in Norway. It is presented 
in the project that many road projects are chosen based on lowest initial cost, leading to the fact that 
many projects are not conducted with the best cost effective alternative. Especially regarding tunnels, 
which there are a lot of in Norway, the head of the NPRA, Terje Moe Gustavsen, stated that there was 
put too much emphasis on saving initial cost in favour of lowest possible LCC. Through that, as well 
as other comments from road authorities and other findings, it became clear that the planning of 
projects could be done even better; especially regarding on what basis a contract is selected.  
As the specialization project developed, the NPRA southern division was asked regarding the 
possibility for writing a master thesis with them as case company. Erlend knew people from summer 
internships over three years, and had discussed the possibility with them at an earlier date. Later an 
answer was received from the NPRA central regional division, which covers Møre og Romsdal and 
the Trøndelag region of Norway. In November 2013, the initial meeting was held, and agreement was 
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reached regarding the wish to arrange the master thesis in collaboration with the NPRA. When 
discussing scope for the thesis, the project group had some thoughts of what could be a point of attack. 
The project group saw that the recent election result made room for a PPP project focus. The 
government clearly stated in their platform that a focus point for them was developing more roads with 
the PPP strategy. As all involved parts had this in mind, PPP was agreed upon being a very good 
theme. Before Christmas 2013, there was a mutual agreement to collaborate and doing a master thesis 
where the main theme was comparing a traditional procurement to a PPP. As it includes important 
parts of decision making for a project manager, also giving us the opportunity to compare two 
different strategies, it was also a focus point that was recommended by the supervisor at the university.  
At that point, the theme of the thesis was established. In order to find a specific problem statement, a 
collaboration with both the supervisor and the NPRA was necessary. During a meeting with the 
NPRA, different points of attack was discussed, regarding data availability, possibility for publication 
of the thesis and what methodology best suited for the problem statement. Initial thoughts included 
comparing only two projects, with rather similar conditions. At the beginning, the aim was to compare 
two similar projects, E39 Klett-Bårdshaug and E6 Trondheim-Stjørdal, because there are rather small 
differences between them, except what contract strategy is used. Both routes include a variety of road 
in the day, bridges and tunnels, as well as they have not too big deviation in daily traffic volume. The 
climate conditions and geographical conditions are also very similar. NPRA agreed to this, and Ivar 
Horvli, one of the supervisors from the NPRA, thought that including all the PPP projects from 
Norway was a good development of the problem statement. This because it would enable the project 
to have a broader vision of the PPP projects already in operation, as well as being able to include 
possible challenges met in other projects in other parts of the country with other contractors. This was 
a good thought, because it enables the project to include a broader view of how PPP is working in 
practice. This is positive both in case of not being able to bring out needed data from the E39 project, 
as well as having better data comparison with three PPP projects as data. If challenges any were met, 
for example in not having good enough data, a utilization of the findings from the other projects could 
also be possible. 
The NPRA state: “The project must ensure that the project get the deliveries that are agreed upon in 
the contract, within the time frame, with the correct quality and at the right price. Quality also includes 
the consideration of the internal and external environment. It is important to us that the project create 
the project in a manner that encourage the most cost effective solutions in the market the project are 
approaching.” (Byggherreseksjonen, 2012) 
Road construction and infrastructure is an important part of the development of the society. Roads are 
very expensive, built with funding from public money. Thus, the demand for facilitating and building 
the road at the lowest possible cost, but still according to quality standards, are high. However, there 
has been arguments saying that there are possible to build even better roads than the specification from 
the NPRA demand(Sjøli, 2013). Norway is also a very widespread country with settlements deepest 
into the longest fjords, along the steepest creeks and on both sides of challenging mountains. 
Norwegians do as well live in remote areas and on islands far out in the ocean along the coastline, 
which again demands infrastructure bonding all these remote areas together. Keeping such widespread 
demography is stated by the government (moderinseringsdepartementet, 2004), and demands the 
NPRA to facilitate for it. One can neither forget that the nation also has big cities, with challenges 
regarding infrastructure and especially with many people moving to the biggest cities in mind.  
Due to the change in the structure of the public during the last decades, with high privatization rate of 
what was earlier public agencies, it is now time to have a look on how the society has developed itself, 
and how the facilitating and utilizing of the new structure of public society is met. The project group 
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thinks that there is a need to look at how the PPPs has performed compared to those traditional ways 
of acquiring and constructing roads. Thus, it is very important to have a development of the road 
infrastructure that can match the ambitions of the government, as well as the NPRA and the society 
itself.   
After the Norwegian elections in the autumn of 2013, the parties that established the new government 
was the Conservative party (Høyre) and the Progress party (Fremskrittspartiet). In their government 
platform, the parties state that they want to put high emphasis on developing infrastructure. They state 
that 100 billion NOK is to be put into a fund, who is set to be done over a five-year period. All return 
from the fund, is set to be used on developing rail, road, public transport as well as communication 
network. In the proposition, it is stated that the newly formed government want to contribute to better 
analysis regarding socio-economic benefit from infrastructure projects. Better prognoses regarding 
traffic growth and such must be taken into account, with reason in that projects should be built to 
include expected traffic growth over the planned life span of the project. The government also want to 
reduce the planning time, especially by having a less bureaucratic and cumbersome system for how 
objections are added and handled. The goal is to cut the time in half. The government aim to organize 
all large road and rail projects as Public-Private Partnerships, as they believe that is the best-suited 
way of conducting these projects. (Regjeringen, 2013a) 
All subjects above, encourages the examination of the contract strategies in use today, and identifying 
how a total operation from a private operator has worked in practice before. With background in this, 
the search is to see how the Norwegian road authorities can utilize it, and contribute to constructing 
roads that can withstand the tooth of time and still be built within the time horizon prospected by the 
government. The more it is possible to understand this, including seeing what triggers maintenance 
and other operations on the roads, there is a possibility to give a clear view on how this expected 
project development can be used in practice. With subject to data availability, the belief is that this is 
possible, at least to have a comparison with regard to what is best today, both with thought on quality, 
time use and best use of public money. 
To find a solution to this, a collection of as much information as possible from projects that are 
comparable and use the numbers found to create a comparison, hopefully via a model that will show 
the difference in costs from the two types of contract types. The aim is also to look at other challenges 
regarding the contracts. Some natural challenges about that, is for example contract formulation and 
how change orders are handled in the different situations. Seen from the NPRA side, it is also about 
placing risks, and how the work stock is prioritized. The challenge is to identify why one of the 
options deviate from the other and how this affects the final product; the road used by the broad public 
mass.  
In the specialization project last semester, the project found that the public is strongly emphasized to 
use LCC as selection criteria in tender competition processes. However, there were many challenges 
left in order to being able to utilize all the possibilities given. Some findings from the project, was that 
it was hard to prove which project in fact was the most cost effective, due to limited knowledge among 
the decision makers, including politicians at the initial part of problem formulation. What the project 
found as the weakest link was that the planning was not good enough. The project found the planning 
being too weak in the long time perspective, considering LCC. The reason for that was that the public 
earlier used an all too high discount rate, almost neglecting the costs of the road in the time span 
towards the end of life. On the other side, the instances eligible for objections during the hearing 
period may have been too comprehensive thinking of all discussion and time used only for small 
changes of path, for example. The new government has mentioned this as something to improve in 
their platform, and seek to shorten this planning phase. This is a challenge the project hope to identify 
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possible solutions to during the problem. However, it may be challenging because the PPPs have not 
been in operation for many years yet. Thus, it may be hard to obtain and identify solutions to problems 
who have not yet emerged. In this project, the aim is to specialize this even more into road 
construction and the TP vs PPP perspective. LCC is of course very important, but the whole LCC as 
the project defined it in the last semester, will not be investigated here. The reason is that the NPRA, 
independent on which contract strategy is used, will be in hand of some of the LCC activities, 
especially in the front-end phase. This difference will be described closer in the theory part. 
In the specialization project it was also mentioned that selection criteria can be challenging to defend 
in case of which offer is in fact the best. There has been public contract cases taken to court, with the 
result that the public party was forced to pay a compensation to the losing part, because it lost the 
initial tender competition due to unclear selection criteria. In the specialization project this fall, there is 
mentioned two such cases, where the public authorities lost due to choosing a part that could not fulfil 
the criterion in the tender formulation. However, a choice has been made not to discuss this further, 
because there is no field in this thesis where it is suitable to include. The reason for not including this 
is that such challenges are of executive manner in this setting. The difference between two tenders are 
normally not big enough to make a huge impact on a long time basis, and there is a feeling that a 
deeper understanding of this is not relevant in this project. 
This thesis seeks to find what contracts and financing possibilities there are, as well have a look at 
what the different types offer. Traditionally, those who has given the lowest total cost, considering 
construction cost, win tender competitions. The only pre-conditions are that they pass the initial 
quality test, including environmental and quality issues. The aim is to find out whether it is possible to 
use the market even better in order to find a solution to build roads with a span longer than the 
finalisation of the road. By that, the meaning is taking the operation of the road into account. Will the 
road have a cheaper lifetime cost if the initial quality of the road is better?  
 
 
  
In order to answer these challenges, the aim of this thesis seek to:  
(1) Create an overview over contract details in the three existing Norwegian PPP projects 
and compare it to the traditional contract formulation regarding both construction and 
later operation of the road. The aim is to find a way to describe the governance and 
payment scheme for PPP compared to traditional contracts. 
(2) Consider factors that influences the LCC in the PPP contract E39 Klett-Bårdshaug, and 
evaluate findings with traditional construction and operation contracts. 
(3) If possible, find a conceptual estimate for the LCC at E39 Klett-Bårdshaug, compared to 
LCC for similar road elements (road in the day, bridge, and tunnel) from traditional road 
construction contracts regarding both construction and operation.   
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2   METHODOLOGY  
Methodology is a means to solve problems and a way of coming up with new knowledge. Any 
medium or remedy that serves this purpose belongs in the arsenal of methods. 
In this chapter, a brief introduction to scientific methodology is given. Methods used in the project are 
presented, together with why they are chosen. The data collection process is presented with emphasis 
on how it is done, the validity of them, and how and why they may deviate from what is actually true. 
The project will mention what the project require from the data to be worth using in the project.  
2.1 CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
This project must be seen as a case study. A case study is a method where the researchers observes and 
obtains information of a phenomenon, which already exists. The method is used to examine 
individuals in their natural circumstances. Unlike an experiment where the researchers has full control 
over what is going on and can separate between events in the research and the outside, the researchers 
has limited or no possibility to control what is going on in a case study(Yin, 2009). For us, the case 
study enables us to get a realistic view on how the different contract forms works in practice. The 
project have no chance whatsoever to affect anything in the projects nor the procedures. Thus, the 
project are only investigating the pros and cons in the PPP and the TP. In order to answer the problem 
statement questions, the project have used an individual case study. Individual case studies can be 
distinguished in two different types, holistic and embedded (Yin, 2009). The holistic case study is a 
description one can use if there are no clear sub units in the case. In the embedded case study, you 
have distinguished sub units in the case (Yin, 2009). This case must be regarded as an embedded case 
study. Because the project have a case where TP is compared to PPP, and the project have several sub 
units in the case, which the different projects must be identified as.   
 Research method 
Research method can be defined as «The process used to collect information and data for the purpose 
of making business decisions. The methodology may include publication research, interviews, surveys 
and other research techniques, and could include both present and historical information.» 
(businessdictionary.com, 2014) 
The data collected via research is used to answer the problem statement in the best possible way. In 
scientific work, one can say that the research method is a systematic effort of getting knowledge 
(Redman, 2009). 
 Quantitative research 
A quantitative study involves few variables, but a large set of data. 
«Quantitative Research is explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analysed using 
mathematically based methods, in particular statistics» (Aliaga, 2000) 
 The quantitative research aim to isolate variables from context and measure correlations between 
them.  The data set is comparable and able to assign meanings of those involved via the answers given. 
The quantitative research should involve relatively questions. Quantitative research should prove high 
verifiability, and be very precise (Sjøvold et al., 2013).  
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  Qualitative research  
A qualitative research involves many variables, in a small set of data. 
«Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, that is, 
how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world.» (Merriam, 2009) 
«Qualitative analysis: A process of examining and interpreting data in order to elicit meaning, gain 
understanding, and develop empirical knowledge.» (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) 
The qualitative research method is context sensitive, and is about understanding more complex 
situations and dig deeper into the challenges you want to solve. Emphasizing the perceptions of those 
involved is an important part of what one is able to do compared to a quantitative research. Qualitative 
research involves a smaller set of involved participants, and those who perform the study is able to do 
a more in-depth analysis of the data collected from each research participant (Sjøvold et al., 2013).  
 
2.2 CHOICE OF METHODOLOGY. 
Choosing right methodology is important in order to solve the problems you have identified upon 
start-up of the project. 
This thesis has a focus on doing a comparison between contract strategies for Norwegian road 
construction projects. The main task is comparing two financing options; PPP versus a TP. TP 
involves separate contracts in construction, operation and maintenance. However, the same contractor 
can have all contracts, but they are independent from each other. In PPP, the same contractor is 
responsible for all these parts. With that as starting point, the natural way of attack will be a 
straightforward quantitative analysis with focus on costs. However, because of uncertainty regarding 
what information the project are allowed and able to obtain, the project have to prepare for use of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods and create two different strategies. One with all data available and 
one with only limited data available.  The project will as early as possible make clear what is available 
and then aim the project into the path that is most suitable for what data the project are able to obtain. 
The main challenge the project are prepared to meet in the thesis, is limited availability to data. Doing 
a cost comparison is only worth to put really much emphasis into if the project are given permission to 
view the actual cost data. The project simply need verified and good data to see the whole picture. The 
project have some indications on that having access to the best possible know that it can be difficult to 
be able to have access to all data. Due to business practice and contract agreements, there may be 
limitations regarding what the project are able to access of cost data. 
Another question regarding cost analysis is what kind of costs to use. As this master thesis is to be 
used by the NPRA, that gives us two main alternatives to look at. Which of the alternatives the project 
will end up using, may be subject to availability, as well as being a discussion of what is most 
appropriate in the setting of the thesis. Regarding the traditional procurement contracts, there are 
several elements added to the final cost, and the project must decide upon which costs who meet the 
purpose in the best way. Collecting costs can make us able to do a cost comparison, even though a 
straightforward analysis will be relatively shallow and not touch into the deeper source of the data.  
As the NPRA are receiving tender bids on all their contracts, doing a straightforward cost analysis 
should be easy if the project get access to the correct data. For the PPP contracts, the project have the 
total sum, and for the TP the project can add construction, operation and maintenance costs. The 
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project can use the tender sum as base for the calculations in both alternatives, and then look at how 
that cost estimate deviate from the factual cost after the contract is finished. The project see that as an 
option, because it is what they must pay to the contractor that in the end is their, and thus the public, 
cost. On the other hand, the project now from the NPRA that they do cost analysis and that are cost 
data on different parts of a road project. These data are collected in order to identify in which range the 
tender price should be. Those data can also be used as basis for the analysis. Regarding data in the PPP 
project details, the project already from the beginning know a little bit about how it works, and that the 
project do not know what information will be available.  What data to use must be decided later, when 
the project know what data which is available to us, if any. What to use if both are fully available must 
be seen in connection with how the rest of the project passes by, and what suit the thesis best. The 
availability of these data will decide very much of the structure of the project. If the project find these 
data comprehensive and worth excessive analysis, the quantitative part will be very important. 
Because the project know that there are different contract parties with different interests in these costs, 
the project know there may be challenging to bring these data into the thesis. However, the exact cost 
are neither what is important. What is important, is that the project can access triggers in the contracts 
and be able to analyse which incentives, bonuses and penalties there is for deviations from the agreed 
standard. 
 If the project, on the other side, do not get access to all available data regarding cost analysis, the 
project must dig much deeper into the qualitative parts of the roads. The qualitative method will focus 
much more on the performance of the road, with emphasis on quality for the users, contractors and the 
NPRA as client. Interviews with involved parties is necessary, and the project hope to reveal 
deviations from different types of contract, and then do an analysis of what is ups and down with the 
different findings. 
This master thesis consists of one part with a quantitative comparison based on reports ordered from 
the NPRA. The report gives us a good view on how costs on operation of the road is driven, and how 
costs are added up. The report is detailed, especially regarding road in the day, where the report take 
all kinds of conditions into account, regarding both traffic volume, speed limit and climate. Being a 
project manager is not about creating all data ourselves. Because none of us in the project group has 
any broad knowledge on how costs are driven, the project feel that the report made from ViaNova on 
mission from The NPRA Central Norway give us the required data. By having this information, the 
project have enough data to calculate how operation costs are adding up on roads in this region of the 
country. This is operation costs calculated from traditional procurement costs and is a good tool to use 
also to the authorities who create the tender competition for interested companies. The report is 
comprehensive, including all operation and maintenance costs     to calculate the costs of a road made 
on a traditional procurement basis with   
The initial aim of the project, the ideal plan who was thought of as the best possible result, was agreed 
upon during the autumn of 2013. In meeting between the project group and The NPRA, the project 
saw that a cost comparison between the TP and PPP discussed during the specialization project. As far 
as possible, it is the life cycle cost of the project, regarded from the public point of view, who are the 
main goal to find. This is, as briefly mentioned, done best as a quantitative study, as comparing costs 
is a something measurable, thus quantitative.  
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2.3 LIMITATION OF RESEARCH  
As mentioned briefly earlier, this study is made by project manager students without any distinct 
knowledge within the field of constructing and maintaining roads. Thus, this is a study with a wide 
focus on collecting verified information from trusted sources. Verifying and utilizing available data is 
important, and the project feel that being investigators “in the field” may be a wrong way to attack 
this. Thus, the project have decided that the project are only into collecting data already available, 
alternatively suggest information the project feel necessary, rather than doing pioneer work ourselves. 
This is especially important regarding technical questions and the ability to verify information. The 
project must trust the information, and the analysis in out thesis is thus based on the data the project 
find available and verifiable.  
This project is considering major road projects only. This means roads with a, in Norwegian 
conditions, high ÅDT, exceeding 6000 at the starting point of the road lifespan, and 11 000 towards 
the end of private ownership life. This excludes most roads in Norway, thinking of operation costs. As 
the project are having focus on PPPs, there would anyways be nonsense to include lower YDT, 
because there are no PPP projects with a lower traffic volume in use today. In other words, insufficient 
comparison material is given if the project search to compare lower volume of traffic. 
The project has also chosen not to have a specific view on the planning of the road trace. This project 
is focusing on large construction projects after the front-end planning phase, which implies that the 
project exclude hearings and planning regarding best socio-economic benefit. There are very many 
interesting discussions regarding how and when a road should be made, also where the trace should 
be. In tunnel or around the mountain, for example. Due to the specialization of this project, the project 
do not enter any discussion regarding placement of the road trace. This is neither a part of the PPP, 
because politicians and other authorities determine the trace after several decision-making processes 
with objections from many instances. There has been discussion about the cumbersome processes 
needed in order to agree and confirm projects. As this process is of a much more political discussion 
and thus on the edge of the focus, the project feel it is not the table and pass it in silence in this thesis. 
What parts of the planning who will not be elaborated further is described closer later. 
The PPP projects are relatively new now, which means that none of the projects is yet to be transferred 
over to public operation. The contract state that the roads are being transferred over to the public after 
25 years, in other words will the first PPP project not be completely finished until 2030. Because of 
that, some of the challenges one can expect to meet regarding the projects, are not visible yet. An 
interesting part to look at will be how the quality of the road develops when 2030 are approaching. 
Experiences regarding the quality and condition of the road at handover will be very interesting to 
have knowledge about, but will not be an experience until another 21 years. Thus, this is a thought the 
project are not able to look at, by natural reasons.   
2.4 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
 Literature study 
2.4.1.1 Purpose 
A literature study is a systematic way of reviewing relevant written literature about a theme or 
problem statement. The purpose of a literature study is to obtain an overview of what is already 
studied in the field of the theme who is chosen (Dalland, 2000). 
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Regarding this project, information obtained in the literature study is made based on sources of both 
electronic and written manner. The literature study are made with sources who are available to the 
public. Norwegian regulations and legislation, handbooks from the NPRA and governmental 
documents, such as the national transport plan (NTP) and press releases, are fully available to the 
public. Some of the more specific contract documents are obtained via the NPRA, and are thus not 
fully available to the public without any extra effort.  
2.4.1.2 Purpose in this project 
The literature study performed is done in order to obtain a broad view on how road construction 
projects are performed in Norway. PPP is relatively new, and none of the projects has even reached the 
halfway of its life cycle. Thus, it is important to obtain knowledge on how these projects are planned, 
and what mechanisms there in connection with payment, operation and maintenance both on the PPP 
contracts and parted conventional contracts. The background study has proved worthwhile in order to 
get the knowledge demanded in order to understand what is important in this project. Some of findings 
in the literature study is presented in this project, as the problem statement involves background 
information. 
 Interviews and observations  
2.4.2.1 Purpose 
Interviews are a useful method to use in order to dig deeper into questions you want comprehensive 
answers to. By performing interviews, you want to be able to find information you would not be able 
to obtain via a questionnaire/survey or other more superficial research methods. Via interviews, you 
may be able to introduce more of the human dimension to the problems you are aiming to solve. You 
are also able to identify personal perceptions, for example identifying information who may be 
sensitive. This can for example be information one may be negative to answer in groups or meetings, 
but who is easier to reveal in a more trustful setting (Birmingham:University, 2006). 
2.4.2.2 Advantages 
Advantages of performing interviews are that they are very useful where one are interested in 
obtaining special information, including personal feelings and opinions. They do also make us able to 
ask questions of a more personal manner, as well as adapting the questions to those you are asking. If 
a question is hard to understand, it is also very easy to clarify the question immediately, in order not to 
have any misunderstanding in the question formulation. A final advantage regarding interviews is that 
a very high response rate is usually obtained, because the personal addition usually gives people a 
higher interest in answering the questions(Birmingham:University, 2006) 
2.4.2.3 Disadvantages 
Creating interviews are very time consuming, and may thus be very costly(Birmingham:University, 
2006). As the project are two persons in the project group, this may create deviation in how people 
answer questions who originally are meant to be asked in the same way. Thus, it is important to either 
be very aware of how to ask questions, or even agree upon that only one of the group members 
perform all interviews. Alternatively can both persons be present at all interviews. However, the 
project do not see that as a very good alternative, because it can lead to the interviewee gaining a 
feeling of being inferior in the setting. 
2.4.2.4 Purpose in this project 
Being able to ask questions independently as well as keeping away from any form of biased questions 
is from the point of view crucial in order to have answers you can verify and use with high accuracy in 
the study. 
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The qualitative study includes interviews with contractors, where the aim is to find the private sector’s 
vision on how to perform construction, operation and maintenance activities on the road. Finding their 
vision regarding activities are very important, in order to see how today’s contracts can be formulated 
even better. The project also hope to be able to get the construction companies to share their view on 
whether there are differences between the public and private perception of an optimal construction of a 
road. The project also want to observe how the private partner are operating the roads, and whether 
plan could have been better if the roads was built better to suit operation challenges. Via interviews, 
the project also hope to obtain information from the private on how their contribution to public roads 
makes their solution worth it in the long run. For example reveal how they aim to include 
technological leaps that are not specified in the contracts, regarding for example lifesaving advances, a 
case where it is believable the NPRA must buy a change order to make the leap count in the contract 
period.  
 Questionnaire 
2.4.3.1 Purpose 
Performing a questionnaire is very important to obtain statistical data in a research project. A 
questionnaire can be both qualitative and quantitative. It depend on more variables, but mostly on the 
question type and the selection of participants(The.Economics.Network, 2013).  
2.4.3.2 Advantages 
With careful planning, questionnaires can yield high quality usable data, achieve good response 
rates and provide anonymity, the latter encouraging more honest and frank answers, than for example 
interviews. This can help to reduce bias (Marshall, 2005). A questionnaire give clear feedback, and is 
directly comparable with the other respondents as all the questions are uniform. A questionnaire is also 
able to identify distinct differences between groups of people, if conducted correct 
(The.Economics.Network, 2013). This require that questions regarding what is the purpose to find in 
the questionnaire is identified and distinguished.  
2.4.3.3 Disadvantages 
A common argument in disadvantage of use of questionnaires is that there are normally hard to obtain 
a good response rate. An argument for that, is that there seldom is a strong motivation for respondents 
to respond (The.Economics.Network, 2013). There are some ways of motivating, for example by 
drawing one or a few of the respondents, and let them win a prize. However, that may cause deviation 
in the study, because people interested in the prize may in general have a different perception than 
those who not are interested in the prize, and thus decrease the validity of the research. 
The validity of the data may also be lower than other research methods, because the ownerships to the 
answers you give in questionnaires often feel less important than in a more personal setting, like an 
interview. Another argument is that questionnaires can be misused, and then lead the data even more 
away from the factual perceptions (The.Economics.Network, 2013). There are neither a quality control 
who can prove that the person who filled in the form is actually the person you wanted to ask 
(Marshall, 2005). 
2.4.3.4 Purpose in this project 
 In this project, the project have chosen to do a questionnaire to control what differences there are 
between contracts responsible for PPP and a TP. The project have chosen to conduct a survey among 
responsible persons in maintenance and operation. For us, the project hope to use the answers to be 
able to identify what differences there are between the two contract types, as well as getting an 
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impression of what the companies who are working daily within the branches are experiencing as pros 
and cons with their own contract.  
However, the project have to be aware of that there may be few respondents to the questionnaire. 
Simply because the project does not have too many contact persons in operation and maintenance, 
neither are there many people responsible for this. Thus, the project are very dependent on getting 
contact information to those involved, and hopefully get them to respond.  Especially thinking of the 
PPPs, where the project have only three projects as reference. The questionnaire seeks to address 
specific differences between operation and maintenance in a PPP versus a TP.  
2.5 DATA VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
The methods used demands from us that the project define whether the data are reliable and valid.  
Being reliable means that the data are covering the parts of a problem that the project want to solve. A 
method of ensuring that is to secure that are sources are being put into a setting that is very similar, 
which do not create any difference in perception regarding the questions being asked. Reliability 
failures emerges because of random failures in the measuring process (Samset, 2012). An example on 
a low reliability data set, but still with high validity, is to ask financial people how the stock market 
will look in a couple of years. The answers will probably be within a range, but will vary a lot and not 
be reliable as proof of how the market will look in a couple of years. As presented below in figure 1, 
Knut Samset’s model shows how the reliability can be low, even though the validity is high. 
  
Securing high data validity is an important part of 
ensuring that your project is using correct sources 
for data collection. High validity is important to 
show that the findings in the project are trustworthy 
and verifiable.  A method of securing high validity 
is to ensure that construct validity are verifiable. 
Construct validity refers to which degree a test 
measures what it claims, or purports, to be 
measuring (Brown, 1996). An example of a high 
validity research that slowly deviates into a less 
valid answer will be to ask a group of engineers the 
correlation between the diameter and circumference 
in a circle, pi. The factor 3 and the first two 
decimals will prove very valid. Every engineer 
know that 1 and then 4 is the two first decimals. However, the following numbers will probably 
deviate, and prove less valid. Many of the participants will probably be able to remember maybe one 
or two more, but the data will not prove valid enough to be used in a project about the number. This 
also explain that doing a good research and know what to expect from your data sources is very 
important in order to verify good validity in your data. If the data are deviating from a good validity, 
you can end up with false data, which you present as true. This mislead a lot and do not make the work 
performed trustworthy. A practical example on how low validity, even though there are high 
reliability, can affect a project is presented below in figure 2. 
Figure 1 high validity, low reliability 
(Samset, 2012) 
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 Reliability and validity in this project 
2.5.1.1 The literature study 
The literature study is based on official and public 
sources. Because the project is using mostly 
public sources, it is easy to find and thus verify the 
data. However, as much of the literature study is 
legislation and signed contracts, there are no 
possibility of crosschecking such data. However, 
the project neither see a validity nor reliability 
issue to this. This is because such documents are 
very reliable and describe all parts very well.  
2.5.1.2 Interviews 
The validity of the interviews in this project is 
subject to validity of those who are interviewed. 
The persons involved is those responsible for 
contracts and projects investigated in this project. By that, the project feel that the data obtained from 
the interviews is valid.  
2.5.1.3 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire in this study is aimed towards responsible persons for maintenance and operation on 
Norwegian roads, generally in the central region, Møre og Romsdal and Trøndelag, as well as 
responsible people for the trial PPPs. Due to trouble in having contact info for responsible persons for 
operation and maintenance all over Norway, the selection of participants was rather narrow. However, 
the questionnaire was never meant to prove anything in particular, rather support or not support other 
findings in the thesis. 
2.6 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE STUDY 
The project group is without bias and is independent from any organisation with a stake in such 
projects. The project group do neither have any stake in the project and are only interested in 
presenting the results without any other agenda than presenting the perception of the alternatives. The 
project group sees this as a strength for the project. The integrity is thus not at question. Another issue, 
which can be both a strength and weakness, is the limited experience within the field and area. The 
strength by that is that the project do not have any perception of what to expect. There is no biased 
view on any part of the project, and by that, there will not be any problem to evaluate all options 
equally. An experienced person on the same area may refuse to have a look at parts who to this person 
seem unimportant, but which the project in the end find interesting. That can of course also be a 
weakness, because there can be restriction on what the group is able to identify as issues, something an 
experienced person easily would identify. The project group’s knowledge within the area is after the 
circumstances rather good, because of the former projects and findings last semester. Because of that, 
the project also have a clear view on what is important to have a closer look at in this project.  
Since the PPP contracts still have many years to go before they are finished, it would possibly give a 
better result if this project was done at the end of the contract duration, and not now in the first half. 
On the other side, as presented earlier with the new government and proclaimed focus on 
implementing more PPP projects, it can be beneficial for the responsible parties to have an evaluation 
Figure 2 High reliability, but low validity 
(Samset, 2012) 
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already now, in order to draw on the potential findings of this thesis, despite the remaining contract 
length of the PPP contracts.  
Due to few responsible persons for maintenance and operation in the region, regarding both PPP and 
traditional contracts, the project will not have many respondents for the questionnaire, simply because 
there are few to choose from. That must be seen as a weakness, because the project group cannot use 
“the law of large numbers”. However, the questionnaire has never been performed to prove any data, 
but is used more to get an impression on how the responsible persons feel the system works today, and 
thus identify ups and downs in having a short road stretch to maintain in operation. 
Another challenge will arise if the amount of data is limited. Then the quantitative quality of the study 
will be limited, something that the project group are very aware of could happen. If so, the focus will 
be changed a little bit, with less focus on having a cost comparison with high provability. 
3 THEORY 
The theory in this project seeks to clarify all necessary fields the thesis will face. The main idea is to 
illustrate which areas that has to be emphasised in order to be able to develop road projects in general, 
and what possibilities the public has with respect to use the money they have been granted and fulfil 
the criterion set by the governmental propositions. It is identified that knowledge about the regulations 
for public procurement is important. Knowing what standards are used in the roads that are analysed in 
this project is also important to understand the development and cost comparison in that matter.  
Ascertaining knowledge about the different types of contracts is also important, and during this 
chapter, different types of PPPs and TPs will be presented. As the government has stated that more 
effective use of money is important, a broad presentation of LCC will also be given, as the principle is 
very important in the cost picture in a PPP.  
Different discount rates has been used in order to calculate future costs in road projects for decades, 
and the rate used has often been subject for discussion. A short presentation of how the discount rate 
contributes to the total cost is presented.  
The cost development for road projects in Norway is also presented, because the development of the 
costs from concept to the initial break of ground and finishing of the project. It is important to be 
aware of this issue when planning for the total cost of a project. 
3.1 NORWEGIAN LAW ON PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
"§ 6 Life cycle cost, universal design and environmental impact.  
State, municipal and county governments and statutory bodies must, when planning the individual 
acquisition, take life-cycle costs, universal design and environmental consequences of the acquisition 
into account" (Lovdata, 2012) 
All legislation around the theme of the project is stated in this regulation. In this paragraph, the most 
important part of the regulation is presented to introduce the legislation around the theme. The 
different parts of the regulation that is presented, is parts that comprises with the assignment and what 
is natural to mention in connection with the issues discussed in the project. 
In this thesis, where the focus in general is looking at road construction, part I and III are the most 
important parts of the regulation. Anyway, part II is also relevant, and will be presented briefly. 
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Part I consist of general definitions, terms and provisions regarding all parts of procurement. Important 
content, such as for whom the regulation counts for, what types of contracts it count for, the different 
thresholds and so on are presented in this part of the regulation. 
 Whom does it count for? 
The regulation covers all public procurements in Norway, which includes the state, county and 
municipality, including statutory bodies. A statutory body is every body that is there for the purpose of 
the public, and is not of an industrial business character. The regulation also covers private projects 
with more than 50 % subsidiaries from the public. (Lovdata, 2012)  
In addition, there is a very comprehensive set of documents describing when a business must act in 
accordance with the regulations.  
 Contracts covered by the regulation 
The regulation covers the contracts covering all items, services, planning and construction of public 
projects. There are some exceptions to the regulations, but these will not affect the content sorted out 
in this project. (Lovdata, 2012) 
3.1.2.1 Thresholds 
The regulation consists of three parts. Due to differences in the size and scope of different 
procurements, there are introduced different thresholds to sort different procurements.  Part 1 are 
general and covers all groups, part 2 covers group 2 only, and Part 3 group 3 only. The following 
limits are general, because there are some exceptions. Such exemptions are stated in the regulation, 
and are in general special cases. The threshold values are presented below. 
Classic sector: Purchases which exceed the thresholds under the EEA Agreement, and generally also 
from the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, and shall be treated in accordance with 
regulations part III. If the contract does not exceed the thresholds, rules of Regulations section II 
followed. Regulations Part I applies to all purchases. 
Utility sector: Purchases that exceeds the thresholds under the EEA Agreement, and shall be treated 
under the rules of supply regulations Part II. Regulations Part I applies to all purchases regardless of 
value. 
There are some other limits as well, but the following are the most important: 
Group 1. Procurements with a value of <500 000 NOK excl. VAT. 
Group 2. Procurements with a value <1,6 mill NOK excl. VAT if a service or good, or <40 mill NOK 
excl. VAT if a building and/or construction project.  
Group 3. Procurements with a value >1,6 mill NOK excl. VAT if a service or good, or >40 mill NOK 
excl. VAT if a building and/or construction project. 
 
The value is determined based on the contractor’s believed value of the project, and there are no room 
of any kind to split, avoid or misuse these limits. (Lovdata, 2012) 
Part III: Procurements exceeding the thresholds set by the EAA. 
The specialization projects will, as mentioned, be focusing on large projects, where the limits of the 
EAA will be exceeded. Part III of the regulation cover such projects, and most of the legislation 
covering the project is presented here. 
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3.1.2.2 § 14-1 Allowed tender procedures 
(1) The procurement must be done by open or limited tender. 
(2) Competitive dialogue can be used when the preconditions stated in § 14-2 is met. 
(3) Competition with negotiations can be used when the preconditions in § 14-3 or § 14-4 is met. 
(Lovdata, 2012)  
3.1.2.3 § 14-2 Competitive dialogue 
(1) The contracting authority may use the competitive dialogue when awarding particularly complex 
contracts. 
(2) A contract is particularly complex when the client is not able to: 
A. In accordance with § 17-3 (requirements for performance and use of technical specifications) 
objective to clarify the technical terms which may meet their needs and objectives, or 
B. objectively specify the legal or financial matters in connection with a project.(Lovdata, 2012) 
3.1.2.4 § 14-3. Competition with negotiation, by prior publication 
(1) The contracting authority may use the negotiated procedure for the award of contracts in the 
following cases: 
- When the offers in a prior open or restricted tender procedure or competitive dialogue is incorrect, or 
if prices are unacceptable according to standards established in accordance with the regulation. 
- In special cases where the item, service or construction contract nature or associated risks do not 
permit overall pricing in advance. 
- Through service contracts where the services to be provided is of such a nature that it can be 
sufficiently determined as accurate specifications, the choice of the best offer can be made by rules of 
open or restricted tender procedure. This applies in particular in priority services or financial services 
and intellectual services such as services relating to the design of work. 
- By construction contracts where the work to be performed exclusively for research, experiment or 
development purposes and not to make profits or earnings of research or development. 
(Lovdata, 2012) 
3.1.2.5 § 14-4 Competition with negotiation, without prior publication 
There is also a chapter including when you can publish without prior publications. The text is 
comprehensive, but it does not add anything important. In general, it is special exceptions mentioned 
in the above chapters. 
3.1.2.6 § 17-3. Requirements for the performance and use of technical specifications 
(1) The contract should be specified by requirements specification or specification of functional 
requirements. In formulating the requirements, the impact of life-cycle costs and environmental impact 
of the acquisition should be taken into consideration. It should as far as possible meet specific 
environmental standards for product performance or function. Whenever possible, the specifications 
are designed to be given to criteria for accessibility for the disabled and universal design. 
3.1.2.7 Selection criteria: § 22-2. Criteria for selection of tenders 
(1) The award shall be made either based on the offer that is the most economically advantageous, or 
solely on the offer with the lowest price. 
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(2) If the award of the contract is given based on the economically most advantageous tender, shall 
criteria relating to the subject of such contracts be used. This may include quality, price, technical 
value, aesthetic and functional characteristics, environmental characteristics, running costs, 
profitability, customer service and technical assistance, and time of delivery or completion. All criteria 
that will be applied must be stated in the notice or tender documents. The contracting authority shall 
specify the relative weighting given each of the criteria. The weighting can be set within a range with 
an appropriate maximum impact. (Lovdata, 2012) 
3.2 ROAD STANDARDS  
The NPRA are responsible for all road construction in Norway, and must thus have a set of standard in 
order to secure that a road built in one region by one contractor is similar to a road built in a whole 
another region of the country. To make sure that the roads are built with the same perception of 
quality, the agency has created a set of handbooks that provides guidance for how the road should be 
built. There are many different parts to consider when planning a road. Hence, the need for regulations 
for different parts of the road is necessary. The system seem to work relatively fine, even though it 
may seem cumbersome. The handbooks has gone through a renewal process in order to make the 
system easier to understand, both for internal and external stakeholders. The handbooks needed for 
road planning and construction is listed below in table 1, given in the old number format. The new 
format is supposed to be published in June 2014 (Vegvesen, 2014b). 
Table 1 NPRA's Handbooks regarding road standards. Source: (Vegvesen, 2014d) 
Handbook number Handbook theme 
017 Road and Street design 
018 Road construction 
021 Road tunnels 
048 Traffic signalling 
049 Road markings 
050 Traffic signs 
051 Work on and along roads 
163 Water and frost protection in tunnels 
185 Bridge planning 
231 Road railings 
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The road is built in compliance with 
the handbook 017 from NPRA, 
from the time of contract 
agreement. The handbook at the 
time of planning was from 1992. 
The road standard from the time is 
shown below in tables 2 and 3. That 
equals a “Standard H1, Yearly daily 
traffic 5000-10 000. Highway class 
B, level differentiated junctions“. 
 
Table 3, H1 highway standard requirements(Vegvesen, 1992). 
However, the road standards have been updated over the years, and new standards from 2013 present 
new classes. Handbook 017 of today is listed below in table 4. If the road had been built today, the 
guideline for the road would be different. 
Table 4 Road standard in the Handbook 017 as of today's version. 
Dim. Class  ÅDT  Fart  Min. road width  
H1  0-4000  60  6,5  
H1  0-4000  60  7,5  
H1  4000-12000  60  8,5  
Hø1  0-1500  80  6,5  
H2  0-4000  80  8,5  
Hø2  1500-4000  80  7,5  
H3  0-4000  90  8,5  
H4  4000-6000  80  10  
H5  6000-12000  90  12,5  
H6  >12000  60  16  
H7  >12000  80  20  
H8  12000-20000  100  20  
H9  >20000  100  23  
 
From today’s standard, the H5 suit the traffic volume and prognosis for the PPP E39 Klett-Bårdshaug.  
Table 2 The different road standards from handbook 017 
valid at the planning phase of PPP Klett-Bårdshaug 
(Vegvesen, 1992) 
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3.2.1.1 Consulting road standards group 
The NPRA have engaged a group of professionals to include in the management of road planning. The 
professionals are external and independent. The purpose of the group is to support the NPRA in 
decision making regarding environmental and socio-economic consequences of choices and actions in 
the project. The group is divided in two parts; one committee for road owners, and one for users and 
other interest groups. The committee of road owners consist of municipalities, counties and people 
responsible for regions. The other committee consist of interest parties, including both public agencies 
and other organizations with stake in the surroundings of the road, such as organizations covering the 
environmental, car owners, cyclists, disabled people and so on. Public agencies are for example the 
police, social and health services (Vegvesen, 2014d). 
3.2.1.2 Deviations from the Road Standards 
There are possible to deviate from these standards, for example in cases where local conditions force 
special design of the road trace. All such deviations must be applied for through the NPRA, and the 
Directorate of Roads. Deviations must be applied for in the early phase of the project, during planning 
of the trace. Thus, it will not affect any PPP project, because it is stated that all such deviations from 
the road standards must be applied for and be either approved or disapproved prior to the publication 
of tender competition (Vegvesen, 2014d). 
3.3 FRONT-END MANAGEMENT 
Front- end management is the management of the initial parts of a project, illustrated in figure 3. From 
the period when the idea of the project emerged up until the decision is made to finance the project or 
not. Research has shown that efforts in the detailed planning phase pay back in the implementation 
phase of projects. The front-end consists of the 
concept definition, concept development and the concept evaluation phases (Samset et al., 2003).  
A general view is that uncertainty affecting a project decreases during implementation, shown in 
figure 4. With time, the possibility to implement amendments in the project decreases. Similarly, the 
cost of amendments increases as the project progresses. The uncertainty is at its highest and the cost of 
amendments at its lowest in the front-end phase. 
  
Figure 4 The front-end phases (Samset et al., 
2003) 
Figure 3 Anticipated correlation between cost of 
changes and uncertainty (Samset et al., 2003) 
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3.4 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) is not a new arrangement; it has been practised in Europe for several 
decades. In 1992 the Major-government in the UK introduced the Private Finance Initiative, what 
today is regarded at as PPP (OPS-portalen). A key characteristic of public-private partnerships is that 
the two tasks of building a facility and subsequently operating it are bundled and delegated to a single 
private contractor, while under traditional procurement, separate contractors are in charge of these two 
tasks.  
According to (Hoppe et al., 2013), a public-private partnership induces very strong incentives to invest 
in cost reductions, which is desirable if the investments are quality-enhancing, but may well be 
undesirable if the investments have a negative side-effect on quality. They split PPP into three 
treatments, one where the contractor in a PPP is a single entity, one where the builder is the main 
contractor and where he subcontracts with an operator. The third is where the operator is the main 
contractor and subcontracts with a builder. In theory, the third setting leads to the same investment 
behaviour as TP. All these three alternatives are viable versions of PPP that one can find. The label 
PPP covers a number of different arrangements, the UKs’ term Private finance initiative among them, 
PFI is also used (Zheng et al., 2008). Other arrangements are Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO), 
Build Operate Transfer (BOT), Design Build Finance Maintain Operate (DBFMO) and Build Own 
Operate Transfer (BOOT).  
 
Figure 5 PPP Scale and risk transfer (Public Private Partnership Council, 2005) 
As Figure 5 shows, the amount of private sector involvement correlates to the amount of risk that is 
transferred to the private sector.  
One of the differences between PPP and TP is that the private parties are not only responsible for the 
building, but also needs to take some part in the financing of the project. 
PPP is often thought to be an ideal candidate for project financing, where the PPP company 
comprising of different parties with complex arrangements and contracts that guarantee and secure the 
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cash flow (Eriksen. et al., 2007). Other differences between PPP and TP is that PPP also often includes 
either maintenance, operation or both. The latter being the case in the tree trial PPP projects in 
Norway.  
Throughout Europe PPP has been used to a wide degree, and the results wary. It is important to 
balance the risk between the two parties so that the risk premium is not too high. This is especially 
important in areas where neither of the parties control the risk, as for instance with a problematic 
mountain. One of the main arguments or PPP is that the risk is resting more on the shoulders of the 
PPP companies instead of the public project provider.  
In case of the three Norwegian projects, the PPP companies financed the building the road with loans 
from private instances. The payments from the government first started when the building of the 
project was completed and the road opened for the public.  
There are many critical voices in Norway when it comes to PPP. They often use arguments rooting in 
some of the failed PPP projects abroad. One thing these voices seldom mention is the difference in the 
way those projects are financed compared to the Norwegian projects. The projects they point too often 
have a financing model where the road is supposed to be fully financed or partly financed by toll roads 
(Bakke, 2011). If the traffic does not meet the prognosis, the government has to pay instead. These 
prognoses have often been too optimistic, so the government had to pay, making the project more 
expensive than necessary. In the case of the Norwegian PPP model, the government has kept the 
income responsibility. The PPP company’s income will therefore have no direct link with the amount 
of traffic, since the traffic volume is hard to control for the PPP company. As a result of the reduced 
traffic amount, the Portuguese government has gone over to a payment model more similar to the 
Norwegian one (EPEC, 2011).  
There is a toll financing part in the Norwegian trial projects as well. The difference compared to many 
of the European projects is as mentioned earlier that in the case of Norway, the government has 
maintained the income responsibility. The income from the toll is therefore an income for the 
government, which in turn pays the PPP Company for operation and maintenance. Another part of this 
criticism is that the projects are more expensive since the building is financed with loans, and the 
interest on these loans make them more expensive than if the financing were to come directly from the 
government. 
In case of using PPP, the procurement situation is especially demanding, and so is the need to follow 
up on the contract once the procurement of a construction company is finished. Fridstrøm points out 
that since this is the case, one should be thorough when choosing what type of project that this type of 
risk transferral is suited(Fridstrøm, 2013). 
 PPP and legislation 
There are no specific regulations that encompasses PPP in Norwegian regulations. Thus, it is the 
regulations regarding general public procurement that covers acquisitions of the size of PPP as well.  
The basics of the regulation is described below. However, there has been made a quick guide by the 
Agency for Public Management and eGovernment (Difi). Among their main tasks, Difi is responsible 
for setting up solid public procurement procedures. To fulfil their responsibility, they have made the 
web page anskaffelser.no, who is a portal for public procurers; where they can acquire information, 
they need in order to perform an approved public procurement. Difi has made a quick guide for 
contractors to make them remember what is important when facilitating for a PPP, presented on the 
web page. The following is included:  
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From the public’s point of view, the following points is the client’s responsibility when creating a PPP 
tender: 
- Organize a committee with representatives from its own administration, customer, 
procurement and property division. 
- Define the external conditions of the project. Include the contract period, the economic 
conditions at the end of the contract, operation and maintenance conditions, co-operation 
during the different phases of the project life, change orders in the contracts and so on. 
- Provide legal assistance to all project stages. 
- Prepare the market to apply for the project, for example through a tender conference. 
- Perform a pre-qualification for the project.  
The following criteria’s should be fulfilled in order to evaluate the option of PPP: 
- Do not enter the model if the project is so small that interested parties do not find the 
excessive planning and tendering process economically benefitting.  
- Do not enter the model with financing or operation as an option. In general, possible 
contractors will not allocate the resources to put enough resources into those projects parts if 
only offered as options. 
- Do not enter the model if the organization has good resources and experience of similar 
construction projects. 
Benefits from PPPs: 
- A competition with a focus on LCC for the facility or building. 
- You get several project proposals with associated secondary operation costs to choose from. 
Disadvantages from PPPs: 
- The competition form is relatively new. There is still not much experience gained from those 
already executed. 
- It is very hard to prepare tender documents. Unless your agency is very experienced, involve 
external consultants to provide best possible documents.  
Source: (Difi, 2012) 
3.5 ORDINARY CONTRACT CONDITIONS. 
The road authority has two main ways of organising their projects. The majority of their contracts are 
organised as what the project in Norway call “Utførelsesentreprise” execution enterprise, and the other 
is “totalentreprise” total enterprise, which is similar to a turnkey contract. As NPRA describes the 
“entreprise”, they are in charge of the organising of the work between the project owner, construction 
company and the project planner.  
The execution enterprise is as mentioned the dominating contract form in NPRA, where the 
construction company has responsibility for the execution (Byggherreseksjonen, 2012).  
 Execution enterprise 
The term execution enterprise is not an English term, but a translation of the term used for the most 
used form of organising projects and their contracts. In these types of enterprise, the owner has the 
responsibility for the project planning. It is first when there is a detailed project plan, the construction 
companies are invited to submit their bids. There are different variations in this enterprise form 
(Anskaffelser.no, 2010). The NPRA normally use the standard NS 8406 –” Simplified standard for 
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construction contracts” in this form of organising the project. Operation and maintenance of roads are 
handled with operation and maintenance contracts, and these contracts are a type of execution enterprise. 
One thing that seems to be common for these types of contracts is that when a new road is planned, the 
road parcels are often small/shorter compared to operation and maintenance. This is one of the 
elements commonly thought to be one of the reasons for the long building time in Norwegian road 
construction. 
The execution contract is often organised in the form shown in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Organising of execution contracts (Sjøli, 2013) 
 Variants of enterprise contracts 
3.5.2.1 Dividend enterprise 
In this type of enterprise, the project owner commits to a contract with construction companies for all 
the different professional areas. The project owner retains control of the project and coordinates the 
work between the different professionals. He is also responsible for the progress and quality in the 
project planning.  
3.5.2.2 Main enterprise 
The project owner gathers the different construction branches in one contract with a main construction 
company. The rest of the professional areas have their own contracts. The main construction 
companies is responsible for the rigging and the coordination of the work done by all the other 
construction companies.  
3.5.2.3 General enterprise 
The project owner enters into a contract with one construction company responsible for all contracts, 
including rig and coordination. The construction company is responsible for the project planning.  
 The project owner responsibilities.  
 Organize a control group with representatives for own administration, users, ordering 
customers and property development department. 
  Hire necessary architects and advisors.        
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 Approve the project plan together with blueprints, descriptions and other contracting 
documents for the contracting of construction companies. 
 Host a contract competition with or without pre qualifications.  
 Monitor the work through their own or an external construction manager.(Anskaffelser.no, 
2010) 
 Total enterprise 
In a total enterprise, the construction company is given the possibility to influence the project to a 
certain degree. The intention being to make use of the construction companies experience and 
expertise. The idea being that this can help both parties both quality wise, and financially. 
The NPRA say that they have a goal of using total enterprise contract more in years coming. The 
arguments are that tis enterprise form can trigger solutions that are more creative, it can give fever 
demands of change, and it can reduce the project owner’s resource use.  
This enterprise for is according to NPRA suitable when (Øvstedal, 2012): 
• The project is placed in an area with complex terrain  
• There is a need for freedom to choose solutions 
• There is a need for a development plan 
• Not to complex projects 
• When contracts include maintenance and operation 
• Needs to be a certain size of the project (road – 250 mil NOK) 
• Site investigation must be done by NPRA 
In the analysis and conclusion chapters, traditional contracts will also include the term total enterprise, 
making it easier to do a comparison with PPP. If total enterprise is mentioned, then it is only total 
enterprise 
3.6 ROAD DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT.  
The NPRA have been developing a new form of organising large road projects.  The road 
development contract is not a contract, but an enterprise similar to the total enterprise. The reason for 
the appearance of enterprise is the Norwegian national transport plan 2014-2023, where the 
government announced an increase in the annual funding for state transportation agencies. The NPRA 
decided that they do not have enough capacity to do all of the planning and designing, so they saw the 
need to increase the construction company’s involvement in early stages of the project planning. The 
road development contract (Vegutviklingskontrakten) is going to be used for the first time on E6 
Helgeland, Korgen- Bolna. This contract has many of the same characteristics of a PPP contract, but 
the major difference is that he financing is organized as it is for traditional projects. It is a DBMO 
model, where the NPRA after a pre-qualification stage and a competitive dialogue gives the contract to 
a main construction company, which has the responsibility for designing, building, maintaining and 
operating the road for 15 years (Sjøli, 2013). The two-envelope system is used in the biding process.  
3.7 TACTICAL PRICING 
An issue that the building industry has problems with is tactical pricing. The idea of which is the 
strategy of altering prices in order to gain an advantage over a competing company. One method of 
doing this is orchestrating a cooperation with some of you competitors on the setting of prices or the 
pressuring of them. This form is illegal.  
Another method is to price the different parts of you project differently, so that you have an unnatural 
expensive start of the project, in order to get the biggest payments in the beginning. This depends on 
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the payment plan following the process plan. If the payment is conducted at the end of the project, this 
is not an option.  
The third option is to price the different posts and units of the project according to amount and the 
likelihood of possible change orders. An example of this is the case of the tunnel project in 
Oppdølstrinda in Sunndal, Norway. Here the lowest offer of the construction company NCC was not 
chosen by the NPRA, which instead chose the second lowest offer from AF Gruppen, which was 43 
million NOK higher than the bid of NCC. In NCCs’ offer, they had priced 12 different types of 
construction machinery to 1 NOK per hour. For seven other machine types, they had set the price 
substantially higher than the normal. NCC put in a complaint with complaints board of public 
procurement (Klagenemnda for offentlige anskaffelser – KOFA). The complaint was found to be 
without basis. Although this type of tactical pricing isn’t illegal, KOFA concluded that the NPRA 
should be able to expect real prices when construction companies are biding or a contract 
(Byggeindustrien, 2013).  
3.8 CONTRACT TYPES  
The four most common contracts used by the public road sector in Norway today are function 
contract, unit price contract fixed price, and billable work. The two-envelope system is a contract form 
that one can expect to see more of in the future (Hæhre, 2013). The amount of risk the project owner 
and the construction company has depend on the type of contract. In figure 7, one can see that at the 
far right the billable work, and that in these types of contracts, the risk is almost fully on the project 
owner. In the middle, the risk is to a certain degree divided between the two parties with a unit price 
contract. Whilst in the far right the project find the function contract, where the project the 
construction company takes more of a risk.  
 Function contract 
A function contract is where the road authority has a contract with a construction company where the 
parameters of the contract contains a function, and not a measurable entity. It is up to the construction 
company to choose when, where and how they will keep the functionality of for example a stretch of 
road.  
 Unit price contract 
In this contract type, the construction company offers his lowest price. The project owner has no 
means of controlling whether the construction company has understood the conditions and parameters 
of the project, whether they have chosen the best technical solutions or if they have sufficient 
experience from previous similar projects. The bottom line of this contract is lowest price. 
 Fixed price contract 
A contract that provides for a price, which normally is not subject to any adjustment unless certain 
provisions are included in the agreement. These can be provisions such as contract change, economic 
Figure 7 Risk balance in contracts (Byggherreseksjonen, 2012) 
  
26 
 
pricing, or defective pricing. These contracts are negotiated, usually where reasonably definite 
specifications are available, and costs can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. A fixed price 
contract places minimum administrative burden on the contracting parties, but subjects the contractor 
to the maximum risk arising from full responsibility for all cost escalations (businessdictionary.com, 
2014). 
 Billable work 
This is a very simple way of getting work done. The construction company that does the work and 
then bills the road authority for the hours used. Often they have negotiated a fixed price per hour.  
 Two-envelope system  
The two-envelope system is organised in two sections. First, the competing firms submit their 
proposals in two separate envelopes. The first containing a description of the firms qualifications, 
personnel and the technical approach that will be followed. The second envelope contains the financial 
proposal and cost estimates. 
In the first part, the competing firms are ranked on the merits of the first envelope alone. When the 
ranking is done, the second part is initiated. Only then the second envelope is opened and only for the 
top-ranked firm. Based on that second envelope, the client negotiates financial arrangements with the 
top ranked firm. If these negotiations result in a contract, the second envelopes of the other firms are 
returned unopened. Otherwise, the top-ranked firm is dismissed and the second envelope for the next 
firm is opened, and so on (Hæhre, 2013). 
3.9 LIFE CYCLE COSTING 
Also known as life cycle cost analysis (LCCA)(Olubodun et al., 2010), or Whole Life Cost 
(WLC)(Investopedia.com, 2013, Jadoun, 2010, ISO, 2008), is a means you use when approaching a 
decision where it is important to determine the most cost-effective alternative among several 
competing solution alternatives, and the alternatives are relatively equal when it comes to technical 
grounds.  
In general, public procurement is very dependent on price. The final decision regarding which offer to 
choose in tender competitions is normally measured by this means. As LCC is taking all costs of a 
project into account, also after put in operation, the tool is valuable and should be regarded as 
important in decision making in a selection process.  
Clarifying the aim and definitions on this term is important to identify what parts of life cycle this 
project affects. Due to the different perceptions of LCC, the following part of the project is used to 
clarify LCC, what distinct the different perceptions, and in the end what parts of the life cycle projects 
this master thesis affect. 
In theory, there are several definitions of Life Cycle Cost (LCC): 
 "The total cost throughout its life including planning, design, acquisition and support costs and any 
other costs directly attributable to owning or using the asset" (Treasury, 2004) 
"The life cycle cost of an item is the sum of all funds expended in support of the item from its 
conception and fabrication through its operation to the end of its useful life” (Woodward, 1997)   
“Sum of all recurring and one-time (non-recurring) costs over the full life span or a specified period of 
a good, service, structure, or system. Includes purchase price, installation cost, operating costs, 
maintenance and upgrade costs, and remaining (residual or salvage) value at the end of ownership or 
its useful life” (Businessdictionary.com, 2013) 
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Figure 8 describe the processes in the life cycle costing procedure, according to Harvey(Woodward, 
1997). Below follows a brief description of the steps.  
The cost element of interest are all the cash flows that occur during the life of the asset. This includes 
all expenditure incurred in respect of it, from acquisition until disposal. There is an agreement that all 
costs should be included (Woodward, 1997). 
Defining the cost structure involves grouping costs to identify potential trade-offs, thereby to achieve 
optimum LCC. The nature of the cost structure defined will depend on the required depth and width of 
the study (Woodward, 1997). 
A cost estimating relationship is a mathematical expression describing the cost of an item or activity. 
It is used for estimating purposes. Historical data will normally be the basis for the estimation of data 
in the model (Woodward, 1997). 
Establishing the method of LCC formulation involves choosing appropriate methodology to evaluate 
the asset’s LCC (Woodward, 1997).  
 Life Cycle Costing vs Whole Life Costing  
The international standardization organization (ISO) is also into LCC, and is making a distinction 
between LCC and WLC, where they identify the difference as follows: 
“Life cycle costing … is a methodology for the systematic economic evaluation of the life cycle costs 
over the period of analysis, as defined in the agreed scope …” 
“Whole life costing ... is a methodology for the systematic economic consideration of all the whole life 
costs and benefits over the period of analysis, as defined in the agreed scope …” 
Figure 8 Harvey's Life Cycle Costing procedure 
(Woodward, 1997) 
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Figure 9, difference between LCC and WLC (ISO, 2008) 
As the project can see from these definitions, ISO distinguish between LCC and WLC. LCC is 
regarded as only the economical contribution, which is made based on product design, construction 
and then operation of the project, while WLC also include the planning process, as shown in figure 9. 
Thus, it is important for us to clarify the difference and present what approach the project use when 
using and analysing LCC. From ISO’s model, the project include all parts of costs, especially 
planning, which have turned out to be a very important part of the analysis. Thus, the WLC approach 
suits the initial perception and the basis for the definition of the view of LCC. In road projects, the 
project are of the clear impression that WLC should be regarded as the definition to be used, because 
the project earlier have found that excessive planning impacts the total cost very much. However, what 
is necessary to include in this project deviates slightly from this. It will be clarified more later in this 
chapter. 
 The purpose of LCC 
ISO set the following as pupose of LCC: 
“The purpose of life-cycle costing should be to quantify the life-cycle cost (LCC) for input into a 
decision making or evaluation process, and should usually also include inputs from other evaluations 
(e.g. environmental assessment, design assessment, safety assessment, functionality assessment, 
regulatory compliance assessment). The quantification should be to the level of detail that is required 
for key project stages. The scope of costs included/excluded from an LCC analysis should be defined 
and agreed with the client at the outset.”  (ISO, 2008) 
With this, it is clear that LCC include all costs related to the project, also those regarding 
environmental issues, for example. Their definition of the purpose support the initial thought view the 
project had, which also put emphasis on the surrounding parts of a project, and considers such cost 
contributions. For example, savings regarding better design, energy saving lights, chemical mix for 
asphalt binding, and so on. 
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 LCC’s usability 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that many organizations, both in the private and public 
sectors, make acquisitions of capital items simply on the basis of initial purchase costs, with the 
notable exception of military assets (Woodward, 1997). This implies that very few assets are procured 
based on Life Cycle Cost. 
 
To easier see where the costs adds up, there is a good way to split the costs in three. First, the 
Engineering costs, production and implementation cost and then operating costs (White and Oswald, 
1976). Figure 10 describes an example on how it can look in a graph.  
 LCC understanding in this project 
LCC will also be an important part of this project. However, some parts of what the project above 
defined, as parts of LCC will not be that relevant in this project. This is because all the front-end costs 
connected to trace planning, land acquisition, lobbying, etc. will be individual posts involved in front 
of the tendering invitation process regardless whether the contract is a PPP or a TP. The quality 
controls to assure that the budget allocations and cost estimates are within calculated perceptions is 
also regardless of the contract type. Due to that, in this project, the definition of LCC will not deviate, 
but what parts of the LCC cycle involved in this project deviate from what this same group defined as 
LCC in the specialization project. This is done to suit the problem statement in this project.  
Taking in the definitions and perceptions from above, figure 5 describe what parts of LCC who affect 
this project.  
Figure 10 Description of cost stages in a life-cycle cost model (Woodward, 1997) 
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Figure 11 Possible parts of LCC, the light blue area describe this projects focus in the cycle 
(ISO, 2008). 
Here the project can see that WLC include the non-construction costs, which is the planning phase and 
activities connected with that, for example the agency costs around the tendering process and so on. 
The lower dark blue box with LCC is what is thought of as costs who are incurring in the comparison 
the project are condcting.  The project could of course add the front-end planning costs as well, but it 
makes no sense because it will be added to the final cost regardless of which of the two alternatives 
anyway, and will deviate from the questions the project aim to solve. If the project are able to do that, 
the project can give a good picture of what is the best option with costs only in mind.  
In this project, the initial thought is that LCC is an assessment of a product’s total economic 
contribution through its whole life. By this, the project include planning costs, production and 
implementation costs, as well as operation costs – similar with the Woodward model.  This includes 
all factors in the Whole Life Costing approach presented by ISO. This implies emphasis on all cost 
contributing factors, also the planning costs. The whole life cost in ISO’s model also include income, 
but as the public not usually are having very much emphasis on earning a lot of money through 
projects, this part are not taken into account. Toll roads, for example, are a way of financing a road, 
and must be seen as a way of just that. 
To clarify, will the WLC of the project still be the definition of LCC, but as the planning costs are 
equal, the project pull analysis of those costs out of this definition, because it will not make sense here. 
The project by all means, recommend to include WLC when doing analysis of road construction, 
because thorough front-end planning still is important to be able to do a best-as-possible socio-
economic analysis of the new road to be built. This is also in accordance with the QA programme 
engaged by the government.  
LCA, on the other side, is not included in the definition of LCC. The carbon footprint, CO2 emissions 
and the cutting down of Brazilian rain forests are not put emphasis on, even though it contributes to 
the world climate. For us, the monetary value of decisions made under the planning and production 
process is important. Which again imply that LCA factors can be used as reasoning in the LCC, for 
example by using more energy efficient lightning, to save electricity costs.  
3.10 DISCOUNT RATE  
Evaluating economical values at different times is an important part of both the private and the 
business life. Discount rate is a versatile tool to express different variables in the same value unit. 
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More precisely discounting allows comparison of economic impacts that occur at different times by 
calculating the future value of cash equivalents assessed in monetary value at a particular time. 
Choosing the present time as value is usual. Price changes over time because the real price ratio 
change, but it can also be due to inflation, which means the monetary value, or purchasing power, as 
commodity prices and values measured in is reduced over time (Concept, 2011). 
The importance of setting the correct discount rate is crucial in project calculation, especially where 
LCC is used as selection criteria. This is to the fact that the costs are discounted to the present value. A 
high discount rate will tend to favour options with low capital cost, short life and high recurring costs, 
while a low discount rate will favour the opposite; longer life and lower recurring costs. Estimated 
vary from firm to firm, and no recommendation is usually given in the literature because every project 
is different with individual risk (Woodward, 1997).  
In Norway, The Norwegian Public Roads Administration used a discount rate at 3,5 % as fixed, plus a 
risk rate varying for the individual project, in the National Transport Plan from 2006-2015, where it 
was specified. Earlier, the discount rate was set at 7 %  (Samferdelsdepartementet, 2003-2004). The 
rate of 7 % did LCC calculations in the later years of a project almost negligible, which favoured 
lower initial quality on the construction (Concept, 2011).  
A practical example of this can be the theme, construction of a road, where you apart from the initial 
construction cost, LCC takes into account all the user costs, (e.g., reduced capacity during 
construction), and agency costs related to future activities, including future periodic maintenance and 
rehabilitation. The objective is to provide the monetary value for the life of the asset. The practice is to 
take the estimation of all the different cost elements, and translating them into costs at a particular 
point in time, enabling comparison. This point in time is usually the present (NPV). (Finnveden et al., 
2009) (Olubodun et al., 2010) 
The project are of the perception that a lower discount rate should be used in road projects. From the 
previous knowledge, the project found that high discount rate favour short time projects. As road 
projects is not short time projects at all, with a lifespan of 25 years of the PPP examples, the values 
decrease very much towards the later stages of the PPP operation time. As well are the costs in the 
future very sensible to even small changes in discount rate.  
Table 5 value of 100 kr over selected number of years, with different discount rates 
Year/Rate 
(%) 1 % 2 % 3,50 % 4 % 4,50 % 5 % 5,50 % 7 % 10% 
1 kr 99,01 kr 98,04 kr 96,62 kr 96,15 kr 95,69 kr 95,24 kr 94,79 kr 93,46 kr 90,91 
5 kr 95,15 kr 90,57 kr 84,20 kr 82,19 kr 80,25 kr 78,35 kr 76,51 kr 71,30 kr 62,09 
10 kr 90,53 kr 82,03 kr 70,89 kr 67,56 kr 64,39 kr 61,39 kr 58,54 kr 50,83 kr 38,55 
25 kr 77,98 kr 60,95 kr 42,31 kr 37,51 kr 33,27 kr 29,53 kr 26,22 kr 18,42 kr 9,23 
50 kr 60,80 kr 37,15 kr 17,91 kr 14,07 kr 11,07 kr 8,72 kr 6,88 kr 3,39 kr 0,85 
100 kr 36,97 kr 13,80 kr 3,21 kr 1,98 kr 1,23 kr 0,76 kr 0,47 kr 0,12 kr 0,01 
 
As table 5 describes, the project can see that even small differences in discount rate make a big impact 
some years into time. There may be small differences ending in putting a discount rate at for example 
4,5 % or 5 %,  but the project see that even these small changes gives a significant difference, with 11 
% lower value of the 5 % option over 25 years. This implies that finding a rate that suit the project 
right, and takes in all risks in a sensible ways is very important.  
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Tunnels and bridges are built with an intended life of 100 years (Vegvesen, 2014a), a change in the 
discount rate on those options make huge impact in the cost calculation.  100 NOK will in 100 years 
be worth 1,23 kroner with a 4,5 % discount rate, but only 0,76 kroner with 5 %. That is 38 % lower 
value for the 5 % rate. It is by that easy to understand that a higher quality tunnel or bridge made with 
kroner of today is harder to defend contrary to an action 100 years into the future with an almost 
negligible value.  
In this project, 4,5 % is used for calculation as the number is used on other occasions and proves to be 
a realistic rate.  
3.11 COST AND BUDGET DEVELOPMENT IN ROAD PROJECTS  
A report ordered by the NPRA, where the costs from initial plan until finished project for 110 road 
projects built in the period 1994 – 2006 has been analysed. The results illustrated in figure 12, show 
that for these traditional road projects, the average total cost is just under 10 % more expensive than 
planned.  
 
Figure 12 Deviation from appropriation (Torp et al., 2012) 
Figure 13 Cost adjusted deviation from appropriation with numbers from "Kostnadsindeksen 
for veganlegg" (Torp et al., 2012) 
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In figure 13, the same numbers are cost adjusted according to the cost index for roads, 
"Kostnadsindeksen for veganlegg”. This adjustment shows a 4 % average increase in cost compared 
with budgeted cost. The average cost of roads in Norway has had a high increase compared to the 
consumer price index. 
 
Figure 14 The development of the road index compared to the consumer price index (Torp et al., 
2012) 
When looking at the development of the cost of building road compared with the development of the 
consumer price index, one can see that the two has not had similar increase. The yearly increase in 
financing road building has increased just below 2 % each year the last 20 years, which is similar to 
the average economic growth. The average cost increase of building a road has in the same period 
increased 8-9 % a year. Arguments for this increase in cost can be that the increase in total length is 
not necessarily the goal, but the increase in capacity. By taking the traffic density as a measurement 
into account, the cost increase has been ca 3 %. Showing that the average decrease in financing have 
been 1,5 % each year the last 20 years (Torp et al., 2012).  
Figure 15, Average cost development through project development (Torp et al., 2012) 
 
  
34 
 
In figure 15, the cost development of 34 projects is shown. From the initial estimate when the project 
is in the national transport plan (NTP), through the awarded sum by the parliament up till the last 
estimate.  
The average time it takes to realize a project from it is presented in the NTP is 8,5 years, and the 
average cost increase is 70 % (Torp et al., 2012).  
3.12 THEORY WRAP-UP 
In this chapter, there is been figured out what is important for the theoretical matters of the thesis. 
When advancing into the empirical data, there is clarified what regulations is important to follow in 
order to conduct a PPP. Being able to utilize the possibilities, for example through using best possible 
tender option is regarded as important. Being able to find what distinguishes the PPP, which in 
Norway is found to be DBFMO, compared to the traditional types of contracts presented, such as the 
different enterprise contracts. Utilizing these findings contributes to a best possible comparison of the 
road project types, especially regarding the contribution to the total LCC for the project. 
LCC calculations is regarded as a crucial part of the PPP companies’ evaluation in the tendering 
process. The focus on acquiring extra favourable solutions regarding the total cost of both construction 
and maintenance is important, and from the LCC chapter, it is clear that having a holistic view of the 
contract period is important to optimize these costs. An optimal solution regarding finding the lowest 
possible LCC, would be having a holistic view from cradle to grave, but it is not feasible in connection 
with the regulations for public procurement.  
There has also been clarified that there are deviations from road standards at the time of construction 
of the PPPs and the standards valid for the time being. It is important to have such thoughts in mind 
when comparing these roads planning for construction of future projects. 
By using the knowledge from these parts, as well as being able to set the correct discount rate and take 
into consideration that the cost estimate for a project normally increases significantly at finishing 
point.  
Figure 16 Cost increase from NTP until finished project (Torp et al., 2012) 
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If able to use this knowledge correct, the foundation for committing a best possible analysis is in 
place. 
 Visual presentation of theory  
The finding from the theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 EMPIRICAL DATA 
As described in the methodology chapter, the empirical data comes from a questionnaire sent out to 
selected representatives, cost numbers gathered from the NPRA and interviews with key personnel, 
representing the NPRA and PPP companies.  
4.1 THREE TRIAL PPP PROJECTS 
In 2001, the Norwegian parliament voted in favour of building three trial PPP projects. In the 
Norwegian model, the NPRA is responsible for the development and planning up until the 
development plan, and to ensure that all the criteria in the contract are met. Looking at this model it is 
the understanding that that it is similar to the DBFMO version of PPP. The tree PPP projects are: 
 E39 Klett-Bårdshaug  
 E39 Lyngdal-Flekkefjord  
 E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand 
As presented in the problem statement, the E39 Klett-Bårdshaug is the focus for this project. However, 
the other projects will be given emphasis too, because of the different test profiles, with focus on 
different measurements in order to optimize the life cycle costs, different payment profile and different 
traffic volumes. The focus will thus be on analysing the main findings for all the projects, and go more 
in detail for the Klett-Bårdshaug project. 
Identify difference between 
new and old road standard 
Norwegian regulations for 
public procurement 
Contract types 
 
Life-Cycle Cost calculations 
Find the discount rate 
 
Evaluate cost overrun for 
road projects 
Public-Private Partnership Traditional contract types  
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Some key figures is presented in table 6 together with the companies that own the contract, which 
companies did the building, which companies that are responsible for the maintenance and the 
operation, and where the PPP company received financing from (Eriksen. et al., 2007). 
The contract length is construction time + 25 years, and at the point where the road has been 
operational for 25, it will be transferred over into the care of the NPRA. The quality of the road at the 
point of transferral needs to comply with the road standard defined in the contract (vegvesen and 
Vegdirektoratet).  
The building of the PPP roads is done in accordance with the road standard implemented at the time 
the contract was written and signed. That road standard is valid for the whole life of the contract. Any 
changes desired by the NPRA will have to be negotiated as an addition to the existing contract with 
the PPP company. There are between two and four meetings every year between the PPP company and 
the NPRA where such desires for change can be discussed and negotiated. It is at these meetings any 
potential extra payments for increased traffic or good road safety is negotiated.  
In case of the three Norwegian projects, the PPP-companies got the financing to build the road from 
private instances such as banks and investment banks. The Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) has been 
one of the financers in all three projects, and in the two last ones, the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
has also come in as a financer. The two partly public owned investment banks often have lower 
interest rates and better terms than most conventional private banks. The payments from the 
government for the PPP project started when the building of the project was completed and the road 
opened for the public. The payments were portioned over the 25-year contract period, but the way the 
amounts in the three projects were divided is different. E39 Klett- Bårdshaug is in figure 18 OPS III, 
and the two remaining both have an even profile like OPS I.  
According to Lasse Fridstrøm, researcher at TØI “Transport economical institute”, there is no need to 
portion the payments evenly over the 25 years. If the biggest portion is delivered in the beginning of 
the operational phase, like in OPS III. Then the government does not have to commit itself to large 
payments over 25 years. The payments following the first large scale will mainly cover the 
maintenance and operation expense, and an extra part so there is leverage if the PPP company can be 
Table 6 Key info of the three PPP projects (Eriksen. et al., 2007) 
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“punished” if they do not follow up on requirements and commitments. With this payment profile, the 
need for massive loan finance will mainly be limited to the building phase. This phase can be short, 
since this gives the PPP company a massive incentive to finish as early as possible. In this way one 
can reduce the binding of capital in the building phase, the building interest is low and the project is 
less expensive (Fridstrøm, 2013). 
As described, over the last 20-30 years PPP has become a common contract form. As such, the PPP 
used in these three road projects has many similarities with the European contracts, but does wary in 
some areas. Listed below are the key aspects of the Norwegian model highlighted in TØIs’ report 
(Eriksen. et al., 2007). 
 The project is generally planed on a higher level from the road authority, development plans 
and property acquisition is started. 
 There is an invitation for pre-qualification. 
 The consortia that is found to be qualified are invited to make a bid (a maximum of 4).  
The bids are evaluated and initial negotiations are started.  
 Two bidders are chosen from among maximum of four to initiate negotiations about the 
project, and are invited to deliver a final bid. 
 One of these two bidders will be chosen for the PPP contract.  
 It is normal practice that the PPP company’s only business is to build and manage that 
particular project. 
 The contract stipulates the PPP-company’s rights and duties concerning the projects 
implementation, as well as the Norwegian road authority’s rights and duties.  
 The contract stipulates the PPP-company’s use of construction companies. A portion of the 
responsibilities is transferred to the executing construction company in separate contracts. 
 The PPP company will build the project, and then operate and maintain it for 25 years. 
 The finance plan needs to be approved, together with all underlying loans, lender, payment 
time and interest rates. In the finance plan there will also be a model portraying income and 
expense numbers for each year in the contract period. The offer also contains requirements for 
insurance. 
 The payment model contains the following: 
o Payment for availability 
o Payment for operational standard 
o Payment for traffic load above stipulated prognoses 
o Payment for road safety above comparable road stretches 
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 Payment mechanism 
The monthly payments comprises of five elements. 
 
o BTM   Payment for traffic load above prognosis  
o BS      Bonus for road safety (max. 1-2 mill.) 
 
 
o BD      Payment for operational standard (10-20%) 
 
 
 
 
o BT      Payments for an open and available road (80-90%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
o TBB  Early payment for parts of the building costs(After the first payment period 
the three first years) 
 
 
The BT and BD are payments post-paid every month, whilst possible BTM and BS payments are post-
paid yearly, and the TBB element is included the first three years. 
As can be seen, BT is by far the biggest part of the payment. This portion is influenced by the 
availability of the road. If the road or sections of it are closed, the NPRA reduces the payment, 
according to the contract. The same goes for operational standard, deduction points are given if the 
reported problem is not fixed within the time limit stipulated in the contract for the specific type of 
error/deviation from standards.  
For all the three PPP roads, the NPRA has three employees that are responsible for controlling their 
respective roads. They check if the road is available and check the operation standard. The PPP 
contract has a very detailed portion where different demands and criteria is listed, with accompanying 
point for a scoring system. This system shown in table 7 is put into place so if the company gets from 
1-10 point, they get a fine for each point with one certain value, from 11-20 the value is doubled, the 
same from 21-30, and over 31 the value is doubled and stable onwards. The NPRA were not willing to 
share the weighting of these criteria, nor the value of the deduction points. 
The different deduction criteria are all listed in Attachment 3, and the contract terms are shown in 
attachment 4. 
Figure 17 
Payment 
mechanism 
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Table 7 Deduction point interval model 
 
In 2013, OPS III E39 Klett- Bårdshaug will receive payments totalling 165 million NOK. 100 million 
are from the toll roads, and the remaining 65 million from the government through the national budget 
(Hindklev, 2013). In figure 18, three different payment models that were considered are listed.  
The PPP company sends a status report each moth containing incidents, availability etc. Following up 
this report there is a meeting where the NPRA and the PPP company discussed deduction points and 
availability. Following this meeting, an invoice is sent from the PPP company to the NPRA. Together 
with the close inspection by the NPRA representative, there is an annual inspection of the road, and a 
main inspection done every fifth year.  
 
Figure 18 Payment models 
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4.1.1.1 Contract price  
In table 8, the thee PPP projects are listed with the price, what the price would have been as a 
traditional project, with accompanying empirical figures. For E39 Klett – Bårdshaug, the estimated 
price when it was in the NTP 2002-2011 was between 1-1,2 Billion NOK (Samferdelsdepartementet, 
2001).  
Table 8 Key figures PPP (Eriksen. et al., 2007) 
 
Below, in figure 19, the project can see a model for the finances for the projects. One can see the 
development of loan payments, how big a portion is interest rates etc.  
 
Figure 19 Finance Chart for Orkdalsvegen 
4.1.1.2 Construction time 
The time it took to build the roads was in all three cases substantially shorter than what the prognosis 
was for the same projects under normal enterprise contracts. Figure 20 illustrates the difference in 
construction time. This was something the NPRA had not foreseen (Hindklev, 2013), and there are 
several factors mentioned as the possible reason for this. More involvement and responsibility in parts 
of the front-end of the project, resulting in the possibility for the contractor to start building the parts 
that had the longest completing time whilst they still were doing the detailed planning on other parts. 
Standardised solutions for tunnels and bridges, one big parcel instead of several small ones, payments 
(1 400)
(1 200)
(1 000)
(800)
(600)
(400)
(200)
-
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
1 400
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034
Gjeldsopptak Egenkapitalinnsudd Byggekostnader
Tilbakebetaling av gjeld Renter Drifts- og vedlikeholdskostnader
Tilbakebetaling av egenkapital Skatt Årlig betaling fra Staten
  
41 
 
first start when the road is operational. The financial aspects with no payments from the public until 
opening is regarded as important. These are all plausible contributing factors. 
 
Figure 20 Construction time 
 E39 Lyngdal – Flekkefjord and E18 Grimstad – Kristiansand 
Since E39 Klett – Bårdshaug is the stretch that will be used for the financial comparison; the two other 
projects will be used in the other parts of the investigation, and will therefore not be explained in such 
detail.  As described earlier, both projects are financed by private banks, and both NIB and EIB. They 
also both have a flat payment model like OPS I in figure 18. 
4.1.2.1 E39 Lyngdal – Flekkefjord 
This is the smallest of the three PPP project in terms of budget. The prognosis for the construction 
time was longer than for the other E39 projects, but the actual building time was just one month 
longer. Resulting in it being close to half the prognosis for construction time. For this project, there 
were three main construction companies, Veidekke, Kruse Smith and Brødrene Reme. Veidekke is the 
construction company responsible for the maintenance.  
 
Figure 21 E39 Lyngdal-Flekkefjord 
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4.1.2.2 E18 Grimstad – Kristiansand 
This is the longest and most 
complex of the three PPP 
projects. The cost is at 3,3 
billion NOK, and the 
building time was 38 
months. The contractor had 
a substantial cost overrun, 
approx. 1.2 billion NOK 
(Allfarveg, 2014). The 
private contractor has to 
cover tis cost overrun itself, 
since they have no claim on 
any compensation from the 
NPRA. The tables and 
details earlier in this chapter 
cover other details 
surrounding this project. 
The main construction 
company was an organised 
joint venture between 
Bilfinger Berger and Pihl & 
Søn. For the maintenance, there are many construction companies involved, NCC Roads and Otera 
being two of them. The PPP company is named Allfarveg.  
 E39 Klett- Bårdshaug 
The PPP project that will be further investigated is the road stretch E39 Klett- Bårdshaug.  
The PPP company Orkdalsvegen used the 
construction company Skanska Norge as 
the contractor responsible for the building 
of the road. One of the theories 
surrounding PPP is that with the full 
responsibility that comes with both 
building and maintaining the road for 25-
years, is that this results in a bigger focus 
on LCC. In the case of Orkdalsvegen, 
Skanska decided to build the foundation 
30 cm thicker than what the regulations 
say is necessary, resulting in a stronger 
and stiffer road. In areas with clay pruned 
to landslides in periods of heavy rain, they 
put in extra rocks preventing this. One of 
the tunnels were built 160meters longer, 
due to possible problems with clay areas. There are many other both small and large improvements 
and or changes from the original plan that have been made to increase the reliability and life of the 
road and related facilities. These changes were done without any extra charge to NPRA (Hindklev, 
2013).  
Figure 22 E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand 
Figure 23 Location and lay of E39 Klett- Bårdshaug 
(Horvli, 2013) 
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The original Owners of the PPP company 
Orkdalsvegen were Skanska ID and British Laning 
Roads. The owners now are the pension 
investment funds of Skanska Norway and Sweden 
(Hindklev, 2013).  
As described earlier, the payment plan for this 
project is in some ways similar to what Lasse 
Fridstrøm at TØI suggests as a god solution. The 
payments are biggest the first three years, and in 
2018, the toll roads will close, and the payments 
will decrease to the lowest level, which will be at that 
level the last years of the contact.  
 
Figure 25 Payment profile (Horvli, 2013) 
The traffic prognosis for E39 Klett – Bårdshaug in table 9 is part of the payment portion of the 
contract. It is this prognosis that is the basis for the BTM, payment for traffic load above prognosis. 
This payment is activated if the traffic exceeds the prognosis by 20%. 
 
Table 9 Traffic prognosis E39 Klett – Bårdshaug (vegvesen and Vegdirektoratet) 
 
Figure 24 Contract structure Orkdalsvegen 
(Hanssen, 2008) 
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4.2 QUESTIONNAIRE 
Regarding the questionnaire, it was sent to persons responsible for maintenance contracts in the 
NPRA. It was also sent to construction companies responsible for the maintenance and operation. The 
same regarding the three PPP projects. The questionnaire had fourteen respondents, where one did not 
give real answer due to a negative attitude towards the questions. This particular respondent’s answers 
are therefore not be taken into consideration. The questionnaire was sent to twenty persons, all 
representatives from either the NPRA, contractors or PPP companies. Of the thirteen responses, ten 
were from the NPRA, and three from construction companies and PPP companies, eight were from a 
traditional contract and four from a PPP contract.  
 
 
Figure 26 Who did the respondents represent and what type of contract 
The large portion of NPRA respondents compared to contractor is due to the lack of willingness from 
the representatives of the NPRA to share information on the contractors hired in their projects. Given 
this lack of database, the questionnaire dos not give the desired reliability in form of a stable database. 
It does however give pointers in some questions, and a good basis for questions in the interviews 
conducted.  
The questionnaire had 10 questions in Norwegian, where the intention of the three first are to map who 
the person is representing and what type of contract it is he is handling. The questions are translated 
into English, with the text in appendix 1. 
Question 1-3:  
The answering options are for the first the NPRA or a contractor. For the second it is PPP contract or 
regular operation and maintenance contract. The third is what region of Norway the contract is.  
Question 4: 
“If you would have been responsible for the project planning and building of the road stretch you are 
responsible for. To what extend would you have made changes to enhance the total quality and reduce 
the need for maintenance?” 
The answering possibility was a scale 1-10, where 1= to no or little extent 10 = to a large extent 
The aim with this question is to find out whether there is a consensus that maintenance cost reducing 
measures are better planned within PPP because the constructor and operator are the same.  
Result: As figure 27 shows, there are similar results between TP and PPP contracts, and NPRA and 
private representatives. Respondent 6, 10 and 13 are representatives from construction company, the 
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rest from the NPRA.  
 
Figure 27 Graph showing the willingness to do changes 
Average Construction company: 6.33 
Average NPRA: 7.2 
Average TP: 7.4 
Average PPP: 6 
 
NB! One of the PPP representatives gave this measure a low score. It is believed the cause of this is 
because they in these projects have made changes on this measure.   
Question 5: 
“Would it be better with shorter or longer lasting maintenance contracts compared with today’s 
length?” 
The answering possibility being 1-10, where 1=Shorter, 5=Good today and 10=Longer.   
This question is aimed at finding out if there is a consensus on this. This area is quite different from 
PPP to TP contracts.  
 
Result: As figure 28 shows, there are differences in opinion between PPP contracts and TP, but the 
results for NPRA and construction company representatives are more similar. Respondent 6, 10 and 13 
are representatives from construction company, the rest from the NPRA. 
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Figure 28 Graph showing the desired duration of contracts 
Average Construction company: 6 
Average NPRA: 6.7 
Average TP: 6.77 
Average PPP: 4.25 
Question 6: 
“What is the amount of supervision perceived to be?” 
The answering possibility being 1-10, where 1=seldom and 10=often. 
The amount of perceived supervision from SVV is not the same as the factual amount. It can give an 
indication if the amount should be higher, connected with the next question.  
Result: As figure 29 shows, there are differences in opinion between PPP contracts and TP, but the 
results for NPRA and construction company representatives are more similar. Respondent 6, 10 and 13 
are representatives from construction company, the rest from the NPRA.
 
Figure 29 Graph showing the amount of perceived supervision 
Average Construction company: 5.66 
Average NPRA: 5.7 
Average TP: 5.22 
Average PPP: 4.25 
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Question 7: 
“To what extent would the quality of the maintenance increase with closer supervision and stronger 
sanctions?” 
The answering possibility being 1-10, where 1=no change and 10=big change 
The aim of the questions is to identify differences in supervision between PPP and TP. 
Result: As figure 30 shows, there are differences in opinion between PPP contracts and TP, but the 
results for NPRA and construction company representatives are more similar. Respondent 6, 10 and 13 
are representatives from construction company, the rest from the NPRA. 
 
Figure 30 Graph showing thoughts about increased quality with more supervision 
Average Construction company: 3 
Average NPRA: 6.5 
Average TP: 6.22 
Average PPP: 4.5 
Question 8 and 9: 
8. “What is the length of the road under your supervision?” 
9. “Does this length give the best utilization your time and equipment?” 
The answering possibility being three options. Too short, good or too long.  
The aim was to find out what the variation in the length of roads, and what is perceived as ideal 
kilometre amount of road in a maintenance contract. 
Question 10: 
“Do you have any other thoughts around possible elements that could rise the quality of the service 
delivered to the road users on your road?” 
The answering possibility here is an open text box for comments and thoughts. 
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4.3 COLLECTION OF MAINTENANCE COSTS. 
For maintenance and operation of roads there is, through reports from the NPRA, collected a 
substantial amount of data. These data are collected in order to show which costs that contribute to the 
expenses in operation and maintenance of the roads. The data might vary, but an attempt is made at 
identifying what suits this road sector the best. The purpose is to identify which costs comes from 
operation and maintenance, as well as trying to see whether the operators of the PPP projects has done 
anything in particular to try to reduce or optimize these costs. The ViaNova report delivered in 2014 is 
a report covering maintenance and operation of roads in the central region of the NPRA. Thus, the data 
is very reliable and valid for the area covered in the project as well. The report is comprehensive and 
includes much more data than could have been included in the analysis performed in this project. 
Regarding general costs of operation and 
maintenance it is very hard, if not impossible, to 
obtain actual tender sums for a specified road 
sector, such as the reference sectors which were 
presented in the problem statement. The reason for 
this is that all operation and maintenance contracts 
in a region is also sorted in regions. This implies 
that the contract covering for example E6 east, 
Trondheim-Stjørdal, is implemented in the contract 
1606 Trondheim-Malvik (approx. 440 km 
road)(Vegvesen, 2009) and 1706 Stjørdal  (approx. 
713 km road)(Vegvesen, 2014c). These contracts 
include all roads owned by the NPRA in the area 
around Trondheim (see figure 31), with exception 
of the E39 Klett-Bårdshaug which is a PPP 
contract. In the latest competition for the contract, 
the bid that won the 1606 Trondheim contract was 
at 145 million kroner, and the 1706 contract for Stjørdal was at 203,4 million kroner. Both contracts 
with a five-year duration and the price is for the whole period. Thus, it is not possible to bring out an 
actual tender sum for a specified road sector. Because of that, the sum regarding operation and 
maintenance will be carried out with help of the report made by ViaNova. The report is described in 
the methodology chapter, and numbers equalling the E39 is used in order to carry out a hypothetical 
maintenance cost for the sector. Basis for all calculations presented in the chapter, can be found in 
attachment 5, “calculations of maintenance costs for the project.”  
Facts about the road sector is shown in table 10.  
Table 10, Road data PPP Klett-Bårdshaug 
 
 
Total meters (approx.) 26839 100 %
Total meters tunnel (approx.) 10740 40 %
Total meters bridge (approx.) 845 3 %
Total meters road in the day (approx.) 15254 57 %
Road data for the PPP stretch Klett-Bårdshaug:
Figure 31 Maintenance contracts in central 
region of the NPRA. Contracts covering the 
Trondheim area are highlighted in the red 
circle (Vegvesen, 2012b). 
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4.4 TRAFFIC MEASUREMENTS AT THE E39 KLETT-BÅRDSHAUG 
To find out how many vehicles used as a basis for calculations, the contract state that “the average of 
three measuring points along the route gives the prognosis of which points to count”(Orkdalsvegen 
and Vegvesen, 2003). The three measuring points used for calculations, are the Brekktunnelen (5,2 km 
from Klett), the Mansfjelltunnelen (10,4 km) and the Storsandtunnelen (20,3 km). To measure the 
traffic volumes along the road, the public sources available are used, including road maps and traffic 
measurement data available from the NPRA on the internet. The deep red background color indicates 
that the numbers are not included in the calculations.  
Table 11, Traffic calculations for Klett-Bårdshaug 
 
Measuring point Øysand Brekktunnelen
Mansfjelltu-
nnelen Storsand Total
Meter from Klett roundabout 2898 5188 10388 20268
Traffic prognosis E39, from 
contract.
Extra 
payment?
prognosis + 
20 %
2005 6904 9705 8251 7894 6313 7486 no 8285
2006 6847 9894 8455 7888 6428 7590 no 8216
2007 7019 10398 8994 8508 6821 8108 no 8423
2008 7196 10986 9306 8648 7029 8328 no 8635
2009 7377 10834 9392 8745 7151 8429 no 8852
2010 7563 10885 9275 8774 7176 8408 no 9076
2011 7738 10935 9538 8989 7507 8678 no 9286
2012 7917 11086 9692 9167 7599 8819 no 9500
2013 8101 11689 10017 9426 7678 9040 no 9721
2014 8288 11916 10265 9616 7869 9250 no 9946
2015 8480 12148 10519 9810 8066 9465 no 10176
2016 8665 12385 10779 10007 8267 9685 no 10398
2017 8854 12626 11046 10209 8473 9909 no 10625
2018 9047 12872 11320 10415 8684 10140 no 10856
2019 9245 13122 11600 10625 8901 10375 no 11094
2020 9447 13377 11887 10839 9123 10616 no 11336
2021 9608 13638 12181 11057 9350 10863 no 11530
2022 9772 13903 12483 11280 9583 11115 no 11726
2023 9938 14174 12792 11508 9822 11374 no 11926
2024 10108 14449 13108 11740 10067 11638 no 12130
2025 10280 14731 13433 11976 10318 11909 no 12336
2026 10453 15017 13765 12218 10575 12186 no 12544
2027 10628 15310 14106 12464 10839 12470 no 12754
2028 10807 15608 14455 12715 11109 12760 no 12968
2029 10989 15911 14813 12971 11386 13057 no 13187
2030 11173 16221 15179 13233 11670 13361 no 13408
extra pay? 0 of the years
measured by the NPRA
own calculated prognosis
PPP contract forecast
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The forecasts measures that the traffic, with a little higher increase than the forecasted average of 
today, probably will exceed the “extra payment value” towards the end of the contract period. 
However, the traffic must increase more than 2 % each year to reach the extra payment value, which 
not is corresponding with the forecasted value in NTP, which is set to be around 1,5 % 
(Samferdelsdepartementet, 2003-2004) . 
4.5 CALCULATION OF TOTAL MAINTENANCE COSTS OVER THE WHOLE 
OPERATION PERIOD FOR THE PPP PROJECT KLETT-BÅRDSHAUG 
 Tunnels 
The report “Moderne vegtunneler”, “Modern road tunnels”, analysis from 2012, identifies that a tunnel 
with a yearly average daily traffic of about 10000 costs somewhere between 800 000 – 1 000 000 
NOK per kilometre per year (Vegvesen, 2012). The report has also made a linear function made on 
basis of the average cost of all oversea one-tube tunnels, showing the increase of costs as traffic 
increases.  The function is used in order to calculate the maintenance costs each year for the tunnel 
part. The function used is reliable and is presented in figure 32. 
 Bridges 
The maintenance cost for bridges are based on the value of earlier data captured by the NPRA and 
calculations made by ViaNova based on the numbers delivered. The cost for bridges, independent 
from YDT and speed limit, is set to be 209 kr/m2, which has been tested to most bridges in the region 
and prove as a good value. Thus, that cost is applied to the calculations of the maintenance costs for 
Figure 32 Regression line showing how the maintenance costs of a tunnel increases as function of 
YDT (Vegvesen, 2012). 
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the whole sector. The road sector is built with a road width at 10 meters, with some sectors at 13 
meters width. (3,5 meters width at the one lane sector, 3,25 meters width in the two lane, as well as 1,5 
meter shoulders). The Hammersbrua and Saltnesbrua in Buvik has three lanes (2+1) over its whole 
length, as well as an exit way towards the end of one of the sides, which makes part of the road a 3,5 
lane. Calculations are here entered with a 16,25 m width for 30 meter of each of the bridges. One of 
the bridges is probably longer than 30 meters and the other probably below, but the average of them is 
somewhere close to 30 meters. Rossvollbrua in Børsa has three lanes (2+1) over its whole length. The 
Kallfossbrua is a two-lane bridge with a width of 10 meters over the whole length. 
 Road in the day 
Regarding road in the day, the maintenance report by ViaNova, has done the same calculations, with a 
differentiation between different road types. For calculations, the costs they calculate for road type H4, 
H5, H6 is used. This road type corresponds to a road with an YDT of between 4000 and 20000, with a 
speed limit between 60-90 km/h. The average of these roads in central region is around the traffic 
volume at Klett-Bårdshaug. The data collected for these roads is also very reliable when you look at 
the regression line that is showing the average of the roads, as shown in the figure 33. Due to 
uncertainty regarding differences in cost for three lanes compared to two, such a difference in not 
taken into account in the maintenance cost calculations. 
 Model development 
The model calculating the maintenance costs is very advanced, including several variables. It includes 
adjusted value for the krone; all values are of 2013 kroner. Traffic volume for the different sections of 
the road are taken into account. As well is the difference in maintenance value for tunnels, bridges 
(including different width) and road in the day. The traffic volumes are adjusted for expected growth 
over the years. The values is used to show where the maintenance costs comes from, both with 
emphasis on which road element, and which road sector is most cost consuming. As mentioned earlier, 
all basis data come from the report “moderne vegtunneler” report and the maintenance and operation 
report for the central region of the NPRA, made by ViaNova.  All numbers are conceptual, and made 
on the basis from the explanation above. 
Figure 33, The Green line indicates maintenance costs for the road type used in the calculation. The 
data are within an acceptable range of the regression line (ViaNova, 2014). 
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 Presentation of maintenance costs 
It is important to remember that the costs calculated from this report refers to the costs that the NPRA 
has as historical figures. This implies that the costs calculated for the Klett-Bårdshaug sector is not 
representing the cost picture for the PPP company. However, it can be utilized as reference for 
maintenance costs for the PPP company, by for example, prove useful as a benchmark. Because there 
are no possibilities to find factual costs for a reference sector to use, it is supposed to be very useful to 
calculate the hypothetical costs for maintenance for this road specifically. Then it is possible to present 
what differences the two types of road owners in the analysis chapter. In this case, especially regarding 
the extra costs Orkdalsvegen has selected to take in the construction phase in order to optimize the 
LCC for the whole project. 
 Short presentation of the different sectors of the road: 
4.5.6.1 Klett-Øysand  
The sector between Klett and Øysand represent 17 % of the total length of the road. It consists of road 
in the day only, and a part of the road is upgraded from old existing road from the PPP company prior 
to opening. 
Table 12, Calculated maintenance costs for Klett-Øysand 
  
  
Klett - Øysand
tunnel Road bridge 10 bridge 13 bridge 16,25
0 4306 0 205 0
2005 2010 -kr         10 265 638kr      -kr                       3 873 295kr  -kr              
2011 2016 -kr         9 150 063kr         -kr                       3 278 408kr  -kr              
2017 2022 -kr         7 503 793kr         -kr                       2 517 475kr  -kr              
2023 2028 -kr         6 137 834kr         -kr                       1 933 159kr  -kr              
2027 2030 -kr         1 350 457kr         -kr                       407 188kr      -kr              
total: 46 417 311kr         
% of total: 13 %
time period
Maintenance cost for the stretch (discounted 2013 kr)
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4.5.6.2 Øysand-Buvik 
The sector Øysand-Buvik represent 11 % of the total road sector and consist of all road elements.  
Table 13, Calculated maintenance costs for Øysand-Buvik 
 
  
4.5.6.3 Buvik-Børsa 
The road sector Buvik-Børsa also consist of all road elements, and 24 % of the total road sector. 
Table 14, Calculated maintenance costs for Buvik-Børsa 
  
  
Øysand- Buvik
tunnel Road bridge 10 bridge 13 bridge 16,25
1440 1402 0 180 30
2005 2010 8 180 219kr  3 117 206kr  -kr                 3 400 942kr  719 430kr     
2011 2016 7 514 996kr  2 782 506kr  -kr                 2 878 602kr  608 935kr     
2017 2022 6 411 947kr  2 292 937kr  -kr                 2 210 466kr  467 599kr     
2023 2028 5 501 949kr  1 901 653kr  -kr                 1 697 408kr  359 067kr     
2027 2030 1 248 098kr  422 291kr      -kr                 357 531kr      75 632kr        
total: 52 149 413kr  
% of total: 15 %
time period
Maintenance cost for the stretch (discounted 2013 kr)
Buvik- Børsa
tunnel Road bridge 10 bridge 13 bridge 16,25
2870 3155 0 260 30
2005 2010 15 634 378kr  6 830 674kr  -kr                 4 912 472kr  719 430kr     
2011 2016 14 339 349kr  6 085 955kr  -kr                 4 157 981kr  608 935kr     
2017 2022 12 000 399kr  4 945 586kr  -kr                 3 192 896kr  467 599kr     
2023 2028 10 051 697kr  4 027 904kr  -kr                 2 451 811kr  359 067kr     
2027 2030 2 241 621kr     882 640kr      -kr                 516 434kr      75 632kr        
total: 94 502 458kr  
% of total: 27 %
time period
Maintenance cost for the stretch (discounted 2013 kr)
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4.5.6.4 Børsa-Bårdshaug 
The Børsa-Bårdshaug sector also consist of all road elements. The sector is the only sector with a two 
lane, 10 meter wide bridge. 48 % of the PPP contract is in this sector. The last part of the road is 
upgraded from existing road. 
Table 15, Calculated maintenance costs for Børsa-Bårdshaug 
  
 Maintenance cost per road element. 
When planning a road sector, the importance of having the maintenance cost in mind for different road 
elements is important. Not only the construction itself need to be analysed, but also the cost of 
maintaining the elements after completion, in other words during operation. This table present the 
maintenance cost contribution to the different road elements in the contract. 
Table 16, Maintenance cost comparison for different road elements 
 
From the table there can be seen that the tunnels and bridges are standing for a high proportion of the 
maintenance costs, compared to relative length of the element.  
 Additional maintenance costs. 
In addition to the costs presented above, there are fixed costs for road elements that is depending on 
other variables used in the calculations above, according to the report. The costs has not been 
implemented in the models, because it has been difficult to obtain factual values of the elements. 
These costs is neither seen as a point where there are possibilities of large savings, because the output 
is relatively standardised. However, it is important to include the costs in comprehensive calculations, 
because the costs will be added to the final budget. The table below describes the costs and possible 
variation for the different elements. 
  
Børsa- Bårdshaug
tunnel Road bridge 10 bridge 13 bridge 16,25
6430 6391 140 0 0
2005 2010 30 698 838kr  12 759 800kr  2 034 752kr       -kr        -kr              
2011 2016 28 179 968kr  11 346 410kr  1 722 240kr       -kr        -kr              
2017 2022 23 773 150kr  9 243 735kr     1 322 501kr       -kr        -kr              
2023 2028 20 245 010kr  7 593 234kr     1 015 543kr       -kr        -kr              
2027 2030 4 558 220kr     1 672 518kr     213 907kr           -kr        -kr              
total: 156 379 828kr   
% of total: 45 %
Maintenance cost for the stretch (discounted 2013 kr)
time period
Cost per element % of maintenance costs
Total meters (approx.) 26839 100 % 349 449 010kr         100 %
Total meters tunnel (approx.) 10740 40 % 190 579 840kr         55 %
Total meters bridge (approx.) 845 3 % 48 556 335kr           14 %
Total meters road in the day (approx.) 15254 57 % 110 312 835kr         32 %
Road data for the PPP stretch Klett-Bårdshaug:
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Table 17 Costs for additional road elements, including variation (ViaNova, 2014) 
Object [unit]  Annuity cost Variation Variation reason 
Brick Wall [m]  19,70 kr/m  5-50 kr/m  Height, units per area. 
Noise barrier [m]  171 kr/m  60-350 kr/m  Material, height  
Shelter [pcs]  15 400 kr/pcs 13 500-17 500 kr/pcs  
Material, winter 
conditions 
Rock cutting and restraint [m2]  36,60 kr/m2  15-60 kr/ m2  Height, securing type  
Railings [m]  9,60 kr/m  7-20 kr/m  
Type of railing, type of 
ending, as well as 
number of endpoints  
Cushions [pcs]  946 kr/pcs 650-1650 kr/pcs  Type 
Fence [m]  28,00 kr/m  13-65 kr/m  Type  
Signalling [pcs]  48 000 kr/pc 20 000-85 000 kr/pc Amount, type and YDT  
CCTV [pc]  9660 kr/pc 6000-23 000 kr/pc  Life time of the camera  
Road Lighting [km] (Cost 
applies at one sided road 
lighting) 
52 600 kr/km  42 000-62 000 kr/km  YDT and speed limit  
Main Picnic [pcs]  
(Cost includes cleaning, 
buildings and equipment, 
provided toilet connected to 
the public network) 
359 000 kr/pc 250 000-810 000 kr/pc 
Opening times, amount 
and equipment type 
Small / medium sized picnic 
[pc] (Cost includes cleaning, 
buildings and equipment) 
49 500 kr/pcs  30 000-315 000 kr/pcs  
Opening times, amount 
and equipment type 
Grassland Area [m2] 6,21 kr/m2  1-8 kr/ m2  
Average temperature 
during summer months 
Shrub Area [m2] 25,90 kr/m2  13-40 kr/ m2  
Climate  and type of 
shrubs 
Trees [pcs] 194 kr/pc 95-300 kr/pc Climate and type of tree 
Flower Fields [m2] 116 kr/m2  55-240 kr/ m2  
Level of ambition for 
the area, climate  
Curb stone [m]  1,81 kr/m  1,50-4 kr/m  
Placement, YDT and 
speed limit  
Pavement [m]  75,40 kr/m  70-95 kr/m  
Width and winter 
conditions  
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4.6 INTERVIEWS  
Interviews with key persons in the three PPP companies and the NPRA have been held, where the 
questions are based on the theory gathered and from the responses in the questionnaire. The responses 
from these interviews that were relevant are imbedded and analysed in the analysis chapter. The 
interview guide is described in attachment 1.  
 Central findings 
From the interviews, some aspects are especially interesting for this thesis. Central citations and 
findings are presented below. 
4.6.1.1 Building time 
All three PPP company representatives mentioned several measures implemented with a goal of 
reduced maintenance costs and lower LCC.  
Both interviewee 1 and 2 mentioned the free or self-financing of the building, the construction 
companies own planning freedom as elements that reduced construction time. Interviewee 1,2 and 3 
mentioned the size of the project with the possibility of several points of attack for the construction as 
a significant construction time reducing factor. Interviewee 1 also mentioned the possibility of parallel 
planning as a contributing factor, and pointed out that this was something contractors were not able to 
do in traditional projects for the NPRA.  
Interviewee 3 gave an illustrative example when it comes to the benefits of one large project. He 
mentioned the last part of E18 in Vestfold County, which is run as a traditional project. The total 
length of highway is about the same length as the PPP project E18 Kristiansand- Grimstad. The TP 
project was split into three project enterprises, whilst the PPP road is organised as one. At the PPP 
project, it is big enough for the contractors and all the involved parties so that they can fully use the 
resources at their disposal. 
4.6.1.2 Cost of bid 
The bid process for the PPP projects is an element that interviewee1 has an interesting view on. It is 
his opinion that the bid process was too expensive. He argued that the need for so many rounds was 
ineffective in his mind. In a case where similar PPP projects are announced, he would like this process 
to not involve so many rounds, and would have the selection done earlier in the process.  
Interviewee 2 said that since the process is so big and financially demanding, it is crucial that more 
than one PPP project is put forward in the same period. It is easier for the firms to take a chance on 
using resources at a bid if there is a market for these types of projects. He admits that if there would 
have only been one PPP project put forward instead of the three trial projects, he doubts that his firm 
would have taken a chance on competing for the contract. He also mentions that since this is the first 
time they entered a bid for a PPP project, they had to “learn” this type of contract, which is not the 
case for an eventual new round with PPP projects, in turn lowering the cost to some extent.  
Interviewee 3 says that the bidding process combined with the financial model that is used in these 
projects are the two drawbacks with PPP projects in is mind. The bidding process is comprehensive, 
and involves many parties. The use of advisors and consultants throughout the process is a big 
expense, and the number of contracts needed with different parties is vast. These contracts are also a 
strength he mentions, since there is little room for misunderstandings and conflicts when these 
contracts are in place. 
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Interviewee 3 says that the foreign contractor hade several solutions they had good experiences with in 
their county that they wanted to implement which the NPRA had no knowledge about. The process of 
getting these solutions approved by the NPRA turned out to be a “bureaucratic nightmare” resulting in 
the contractor giving up in trying to implement unknown solutions with NPRA eyes, and sticking to 
the road manuals.  
4.6.1.3 Improvements on quality and standardising  
 
From the PPP companies it is told there were made considerable savings due to the standardising of 
elements. Since the projects were large and contained several bridges, which is an element that 
contains many components that are easily standardised. Portals for tunnels are one example of an 
element that can be standardised. The fact that the NPRA does not make more use of the advantages of 
standardising than they are doing today is mentioned. A simple thing that can illustrate this is 
pedestrian bridges over roads, mentioned by interviewee 4. Now there probably are around a hundred 
different bridges to choose from. 
Interviewee 3 mentioned that during the planning phase of the project, the PPP company involved the 
maintenance and operation personnel in the design process. This was done in order to take advantage 
of these people’s experience and knowledge when it comes to measures that could be of use in the 
reduction of maintenance costs. He specified that there was a focus on LCC under the planning and 
designing of the road. The focus on LCC is also one of the reasons the operation and maintenance 
personnel was involved in this process. The motivation of course largely being the potential for saving 
money on this budget cost.  
The different measures implemented by the different companies are presented in the analysis. 
4.6.1.4 Change orders 
According to interviewee 1,2 and 3, change orders have already happened. They have not experienced 
any problems agreeing with the NPRA about the parameters and compensation for these changes. 
Interviewee 2 says that it is up to the NPRA to deem which changes are necessary and which are not.  
4.6.1.5 Road development contract, an attempt at implementing elements of PPP into TP 
Incentives such as the construction companies own gain in having expensive machinery at the site for 
a short time ass possible is one of the issues that is mentioned by interviewee 4, which can lead to 
shorter building time. He points out that in the road development contract, the possibility of starting 
construction whilst some planning is still going on is not an option. 
Interviewee 4 gave an example of if the construction mean time is set to 3,5 years. The company will 
get a bonus if it is from 3 till 3,5years, but no bonus for completion earlier than that.  
He mentioned an interesting aspect regarding this. He emphasised that there is a breaking point for the 
reduction in construction time, and that there should be a realistic estimate, so that the reduction of 
construction time does not lead to a reduced focus on the health and safety of the workers, the 
breaking of the work environment act and the quality of the solutions. 
One of the elements mentioned in the interview by interviewee 4 was the selection criteria in the 
contract. Many of the TP contracts only or mainly have a focus on cost. This is not the case for the 
road development contract. In this contract, there are six different criteria, where one naturally is price. 
Building time, environmental issues and mass balance is are some of these criteria. The focus on 
quality solutions and a clear vision and complete plan for the project is also valued in the process.  
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5 ANALYSIS  
5.1 BUILDING TIME 
As shown in the theory chapter, building time for all three PPP were significantly shorter than what 
the estimate for a standard contract form would be. This is one of the main advantages for the 
Norwegian PPP projects. When the concept of PPP has been mention in political debate, this is an 
element that there is put too little focus on. There are advantages with the significantly shorter 
building time. Although the project has not made any calculations on the socio economical gain in 
these cases, it is in the project group’s opinion safe to assume that there are several societal beneficiary 
effects that comes from this. The users gain access to a better road, earlier, thereby saving time and 
lovers their exposure to the more accident-prone road they were using.  
 Interview findings 
The construction company mentions some reasons for the shorter building time, and the free or self-
financing of the building, the construction companies own planning freedom and the size of the project 
with several points of attack. Being able to plan the project after what elements that will take the most 
time is one of the elements that were used in the PPP project. Whilst the NPRA’s way of organising 
the project, since they plan according to the yearly appropriation. The possibility for parallel building 
and planning is one of the elements the PPP companies highlight. The idea is that the building of 
certain elements of the project starts before all the planning surrounding the project is finished. This is 
a possibility the construction companies with regular projects cannot use, since the NPRA needs to 
approve all project planning, drawings and solutions for the project before any construction can start. 
The parcels are also usually shorter and the big road element, for example a long bridge, may be an 
own contract, with no other collaboration with rest of the project. 
The construction company’s execution freedom is an important factor that is mentioned in the 
interviews, argued to be an important factor for the reduced construction time. Operating at several 
areas in the project simultaneously results in better use of resources in the way of continued use of the 
work force and machinery. Solutions previously used by the construction company can be used, in 
order to ensure reduced time use and high implementation quality. If the project have several bridges 
or tunnels, solutions can be standardised for all constructions. This reduces costs and the time use, and 
possibly reduces the risk for large variations in the product quality.  
The interviewees from the PPP companies believes the rapid implementation is a result of the design 
and execution parts of the project being organised by one party. Thus, the design and construction 
phase occur simultaneously with large overlaps. Results from the PPP projects shows that this is 
something the contractors use largely. Only some planning needs to be completed before the start of 
construction, whilst the rest of the detailed design can be performed simultaneously as parts of the 
construction work is done. This is not something the contractors from normal projects are able to do, 
where all the plans needs to be approved by the NPRA before execution can begin. 
One PPP company representative highlighted the size of the project as the most important factor for 
shortening the construction time. The representative gave an illustrative example when mentioning the 
last part of E18 in Vestfold County, which is run as a traditional project. The total length of highway is 
about the same length as the PPP project E18 Kristiansand- Grimstad. The TP project was split into 
three project enterprises, whilst the PPP road is organised as one. At the PPP project, it is big enough 
for the contractors and all the involved parties so that they can fully use the resources at their disposal. 
As figure 34 in section 6.3.1 shows, it takes some time before the efficiency of an operation reaches its 
optimum. Although this figure represents one process or element, the idea is the same, and the idea of 
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what the representative said. This representative also mentions one element that is a result of the 
private investment banks. These banks/institutions had some demands in order to grant loans. One of 
which were they appointed a technical advisor, responsible of following up the governance of the 
project. The project was to be organised with milestones in progression, and the payments from the 
banks was linked up to the fulfilling of these milestones.  
5.2 BUILDING COSTS ANALYSIS 
Collecting useful construction costs for both the PPP road and a comparison stretch has proved hard.  
The project has simply failed in collecting reliable cost data. The main challenge is having reliable and 
comparable costs from both of the contract types. Although such data has been proposed, and there has 
been looked after data from different project from the central region, it has proved very hard. The main 
reason for this is missing data in the databases of the NPRA, as well as challenges regarding access to 
the database. Earlier, NTNU had access to the database through an account at the university, but this 
user is no longer available. However, that was not decisive, because the project group established 
contact with a responsible person for the Cost Database in the NPRA. The contact looked for relevant 
projects, but could not find any projects comparable to the roads analysed in this project. There are, as 
of today, no new projects in the central region with a combination of all road elements with an YDT, 
which is comparable with the main road.  
The only available data came from a project further south of Bårdshaug. Although the road is part of 
the E39, it is not comparable to the Klett-Bårdshaug sector. There are relatively big challenges 
hindering the possibility of having a useful comparison of these roads. First, the road is defined as a S2 
road according to the upgraded road standards. The road width is 8,5 meters, 1,5 meter narrower than 
Klett-Bårdshaug. In addition, the YDT is not comparable to the Klett-Bårdshaug sector. There are also 
other geographical challenges. The sector consists of two relatively short bridges and no tunnels, 
rather far away from the conditions at Klett-Bårdshaug. Thus, doing a comprehensive presentation and 
analysis of those data will not contribute to a better output of this project.  
This is not a unique case only relevant for this project, according to more people within the NPRA. 
Sources has told that acquiring these numbers can prove very hard, and is causing extra work for 
employees who want to find historical figures in order to compare them with newer projects. 
However, the project is of the clear impression that the foundation for developing good knowledge 
through the cost database absolutely is there, and will prove helpful in the future as more projects are 
implemented in the database. This is of course subject to those responsible for the projects, in order to 
collaborate with those responsible for the database. 
5.3 COST OF BID 
The tendering process for PPP projects puts a big strain on firms. The combination of building, 
maintaining and operating the stretch of road for 25 years means that they have to invest more time 
and resources into developing the tender documents and cost estimates. The PPP form is also new to 
the construction companies in Norway, putting making it even more demanding. In comparison, the 
construction companies are more used to the system, have more experience with the tendering process 
and are more familiar with the costs in traditional projects. If more PPP projects are to be 
implemented, the project think the disadvantage with unfamiliarity will fade away, and approach the 
same level as with traditional projects. 
 Interview findings 
It is argued that with the amount of risk the PPP companies take by biding at a PPP project, it is clear 
that the demand of resources is higher than for contract types where the risk is lower.  
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The bid process for the PPP projects is an element that one of the interviewees is that the bid process 
was too expensive. He argued that the need for so many rounds was ineffective in his mind. In a case 
where similar PPP projects are announced, the interviewee would like this process to not involve so 
many rounds, and would have the selection done earlier in the process.  
Another element that is mentioned by an interviewee is that since the process is so big and financially 
demanding, it is crucial that more than one PPP project is put forward in the same time frame. It is 
easier for the firms to take a chance on using resources at a bid if there is a market for these types of 
projects. He admits that if there would have only been one PPP project put forward instead of the three 
trial projects, he doubts that his firm would have taken a chance on competing for the contract. He also 
mentions that since this is the first time they entered a bid for a PPP project, they had to “learn” this 
type of contract, which is not the case for an eventual new round with PPP projects, in turn lowering 
the cost to some extent.  
One PPP company representative says that the bidding process combined with the financial model that 
is used in these projects are the two drawbacks with PPP projects. The bidding process is 
comprehensive, and involves many parties. The use of advisors and consultants throughout the process 
is a big expense, and the number of contracts needed with different parties is vast. These contracts are 
also a strength he mentions, since there is little room for misunderstandings and conflicts when these 
contracts are in place. 
It is mentioned that a foreign contractor hade several solutions they had good experiences with in their 
country that they wanted to implement which the NPRA had no knowledge about. The process of 
getting these solutions approved by the NPRA turned out to be a “bureaucratic nightmare” resulting in 
the contractor giving up in trying to implement unknown solutions with NPRA eyes, and sticking to 
the road manuals.   
5.4 DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNANCE AND PAYMENT SCHEMES 
The more restrictive governance of traditional contracts is one of the big differences from PPP. The 
same can be said about the traditional way of financing roads, where many projects are finances over 
the national budget over a period of several years, making it harder for the contractors to build at the 
most cost effective way, making the construction time longer and can be more expensive. As 
Fridstrøm points out in his article, the payment model where a large portion is transferred back to the 
PPP company during the first few years is a better way of organising the payments than if they were 
evenly spread out over the whole period. In that way, the PPP company can pay back a large portion 
of its debts, reducing the amount of money diapering due to interest rates. This payment scheme is the 
one used for E39 Klett – Bårdshaug. 
The opportunities the NPRA have in the payment scheme to deduct parts of the payments in cases of 
reduced quality, reduced operation time or road safety is a good incentive to keep the standard of 
quality that the public may enjoy, as is the high safety focus.  
 Interview findings 
From the interviews, it is clear that the one of the major factors for the shorter building time and the 
measurements implemented to gain a higher quality and lower maintenance costs are the differences in 
governance and payment scheme. That the payments only start when the road is operational gives the 
companies the incentive to finish the building faster. The possibility to control much more of the 
planning and have control of the project timeline, where and how much resources are needed at each 
area of the road highlights the difference in governance scheme.  
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5.5 BUDGET OVERRUN 
One of the arguments that have been used in the debates around PPP road projects in Norway, is that it 
is more expensive than conventional road projects (Bakke, 2011). These arguments are based on 
experiences from PPP project in other countries, which have a different financing model then is the 
case for the Norwegian ones. When the finances are not dependent on traffic amount, but a standard 
payment where the toll fees are re distributed back to the PPP company along with normal payments is 
the Norwegian model. This model does not have the same problems, since a lower traffic amount does 
not negatively influence the payments, but a large increase does influence positively. With a higher 
traffic amount, the toll income increases, in turn decreasing the need for public funds. Looking at 
traditional projects in Norway, as the project see in figure 34 that they normally end up with an 
average overrun that the NPRA and government has to cover of 4 %. Those types of overruns is 
something the company itself has to cover in a PPP project, like the large overrun in the E18 PPP 
project.   
 
Figure 34 Average cost development through project development (Torp et al., 2012) 
The fact that the price of building a road the last ten to twelve years has increased much more than the 
consumer price index as shown in figure 35 is something that can be an argument for PPP. Since the 
contract price for the whole project and the 25 years of maintenance is set at the signing, the problem 
of unforeseen increasing prices is not something the NPRA and the government has to compensate for. 
In TP projects, where the building is financed over several years, this could be an issue, and especially 
when it comes to the cost of maintenance after some years of operation, when a new maintenance 
contract is needed. Then the possible higher prices can have an effect that is not the case for the PPP 
projects, where the risk of price increase is put on the PPP company.  
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Figure 35 The development of the road index compared to the consumer price index (Torp et al., 
2012) 
 Front-end Management 
Front-end management is thought of as something that in general can be a good influence on reducing 
the total costs of a project. By using more resources in the early planning phase of a project, the need 
for implementing amendments in the later phases of the project when it is much more expensive can 
be lower. The cost of amendments are at its lowest and the uncertainty is at its highest, in the front-end 
phase. The earlier the construction company and architect are involved in the planning of the projects, 
the more likely it is that they can be a positive influence on pushing for addition amendments earlier in 
the planning phase, at a lower cost than if they are not involved in the planning. 
5.6 IMPROVEMENTS ON QUALITY AND STANDARDISING  
In the questionnaire, question four was regarding the willingness to do changes in order to reduce 
maintenance costs and increase the overall quality. The respondents all score this question above six, 
and the representatives from the NPRA and TP contracts gave a higher value, compared to 
construction companies and PPP projects. All were quite high, indicating that the focus on quality is 
not where they would like it to be when building roads today. One of the PPP representatives gave a 
low score for this means. It is believed the cause of this is that they in these projects have made 
changes regarding this matter. These results were taken into account when developing the questions 
for the interviews, in order to see whether the interpretation of the findings are shared with the 
interviewees.  
 Interview findings 
From the PPP companies it is told there were made considerable savings due to the standardising of 
elements. Since the projects were large and contained several bridges, which is an element that 
contains many components that are easily standardised. Portals for tunnels are one example of an 
element that can be standardised. The fact that the NPRA does not make more use of the advantages of 
standardising than they are doing today is mentioned. A simple thing that can illustrate this is 
pedestrian bridges over roads. Now there probably are around a hundred different bridges to choose 
from. One would think that there should only be two or three. The gain of standardising is illustrated 
in figure 36. 
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Figure 36 Effect of standardising over time. Efficiency over time  
5.6.1.1 Quality 
During the planning phase of one of the projects, the PPP company involved the maintenance and 
operation personnel in the design process. This was done in order to take advantage of these people’s 
experience and knowledge when it comes to measures that could be of use in the reduction of 
maintenance costs. In both the E39 PPP projects choices were made with the reduction of the 
operation and maintenance costs. Under one interview, the interviewee specified that there was a focus 
on LCC under the planning and designing of the road. The focus on LCC is also one of the reasons the 
operation and maintenance personnel was involved in this process. The motivation of course largely 
being the potential for saving money on this budget cost. Some of the quality improvements and 
changes done compared to a traditional road construction project is presented below. 
5.7 INNOVATION POSSIBILITIES THROUGH PPP 
One of the problems the project was hoping to answer, was whether the companies owning and 
operating the PPP’s did any changes compared to the conventional road contracts in order to reduce 
the total LCC. E39 Klett-Bårdshaug was the original road in the problem statement, but as described 
earlier, the project has expanded this to include all the three PPP projects. The project have found that 
the different companies has made major changes in order to reduce the LCC. As the project can read 
from the findings in the interviews, the E39 Klett-Bårdshaug made some major changes in the 
construction phase, because they believe that these changes will affect the LCC cost in the positive 
way over the lifespan of the road. To clarify, this lifespan is 25 years in the private operators mind – 
the public is still responsible to operate and maintain the road afterwards.  
 Thickening foundation layer 
One of the changes from Klett-Bårdshaug was thickening the foundation with 30 cm in order to avoid 
frost heaving. Distance of the road in the day is 15,2 kilometres, and the width of the road is 
approximately 10 meters including shoulders (plus sectors with three lanes). If following the road 
standards of the time, the total amount of extra foundation counts to around 50 000 cubic meters. This 
is an approximate number just to get an impression of the extra volume of foundation layer.  The 
project have not obtained the extra cost for foundation, but the cost is probably a significant extra 
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expense. To justify the extra expense, there must be analysis made from the PPP company that 
concludes with high savings in connection with this extra work and expense.   
 Extension of the Storsandtunnelen 
Another improvement of the additional project plan at the E39 Klett-Bårdshaug project is the 
extension of the Storsand tunnel with 160 meters (Hanssen, 2008). From earlier, it is agreed that 
tunnels are very expensive, both to construct and especially maintain, compared to a normal road 
(Gustavsen, 2008, Pettersson, 2012). Thus, it is surprisingly to us that they on a voluntary basis, with 
no extra funding from the public, chose to extend the tunnel. The project have thus tried to illustrate 
the extra cost the PPP company has chosen to take because of this change. 
 Because of lack of data, it is hard to obtain a clear view of what is the extra construction cost of a 
tunnel. However, there are no sign of a correlation between price and length, when thinking of cost per 
unit. Regarding maintenance, it is possible to measure differences. It is interesting to analyse what 
extra maintenance cost the PPP company has taken in order to do this change. For calculating the extra 
maintenance cost for this tunnel, the measured traffic and forecasted traffic for the tunnel over 25 
years is applied, and calculated maintenance cost for the sector for both tunnel and road in the day 
maintenance. The excel sheet calculates the extra maintenance cost for a tunnel compared to a road in 
the day - (maintenance tunnel - maintenance road.) The function is applied to the measured and 
forecasted YDT for the Storsand tunnel over the operation period, to identify how much extra cost that 
probably has been added to the maintenance budget. With a discount rate at 4,5 %, this adds a total 
discounted maintenance cost of over 1,6 million over the 25-year period (see figure). The values are in 
the krone value of 2013, discounted both backwards to 2005 and forward until 2030. 
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Table 18, Extra maintenance cost for Storsandtunnelen 
  
This is clearly done in order to strengthen the road quality and minimize the risks for severe extra 
maintenance costs, for example caused by landslide in the area where the extra tunnel is made. There 
is perceived that the extra maintenance cost of 1,6 million as well as undisclosed construction cost is 
worth to pay as an extra “insurance” premium to reduce other risks that could arise from the sector that 
now is in tunnel. The clean-up from a big landslide, for example, is perceived to be much higher, 
taking into account that the company is paid for keeping the road open, in addition to the direct costs 
from the clean-up work. Especially if it is a recurring event, and then there is the possibility for lost 
lives in the event of a landslide taking a care with it. 
 Energy saving innovation 
During collection of data and interviews, there is identified that electricity costs adds up to a very high 
portion of the total operation costs. To exemplify this, the project present a table from the report 
“Moderne Vegtunneler.” This is presented in the Table 19 below, which cover all tunnels on the 
highways in Norway.  
rate 4,50 %
kilometers extra tunnel 0,16
Year: Cost in the actual year (2013 value): Measured traffic % increase
1 2005 kr 42 776,51 6313 100 %
2 2006 kr 82 875,87 6428 102 %
3 2007 kr 83 161,40 6821 106 %
4 2008 kr 81 424,47 7029 103 %
5 2009 kr 78 800,53 7151 102 %
6 2010 kr 75 407,21 7176 100 %
7 2011 kr 75 392,11 7507 105 %
8 2012 kr 72 145,56 7599 101 %
9 2013 kr 69 778,75 7678 101 %
10 2014 kr 68 190,06 7869 102 %
11 2015 kr 66 608,80 8066 102 %
12 2016 kr 65 037,28 8267 102 %
13 2017 kr 63 477,59 8473 102 %
14 2018 kr 61 931,63 8684 102 %
15 2019 kr 60 969,29 8901 102 %
16 2020 kr 59 431,27 9123 102 %
17 2021 kr 57 912,64 9350 102 %
18 2022 kr 56 414,61 9583 102 %
19 2023 kr 55 414,66 9822 102 %
20 2024 kr 53 940,27 10067 102 %
21 2025 kr 52 926,42 10318 102 %
22 2026 kr 51 482,34 10575 102 %
23 2027 kr 50 464,03 10839 102 %
24 2028 kr 49 437,95 11109 102 %
25 2029 kr 48 040,79 11386 102 %
26 2030 kr 23 511,20 11670 102 %
kr 1 606 953,26
NB! Measured traffic from NPRA
Forecasted traffic by the project
Traffic prognosis Storsandtunnelen
 0,5 years operation in 
the first and last year
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Table 19, Overview of costs for tunnel operation (Highways) (Vegvesen, 2012) 
 
The table confirms what other literature states, and is applied in order to analyse how PPP has made an 
impact in such a case. The Klett-Bårdshaug road has an YDT of between 6000 and towards the end of 
the contract, probably exceeding 13000 cars per day. From the figure 37 below, the project can see 
that the electricity costs not seem to decrease, but rather increase in future tunnel project with the same 
YDT as this road project. 
Figure 37, Contribution to maintenance costs per cost item, analysed for two existing 
tunnel and a new building concept. Green color indicates new building concept 
(Vegvesen, 2012). 
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It is very interesting to see that more of the PPP companies have taken action in order to reduce these 
costs. In collaboration with others, Orkdalsvegen have implemented the first full LED lighted tunnel in 
a Norway (OneCo, 2013). The aim is to install LED lightning in all tunnels if it proves successful, 
according to the PPP company. They calculate to save around 200 000 kwh per year, as well as 
increasing the life of the light bulbs from about four to between fifteen and twenty years (Dyreland, 
2013). The NPRA is very interested in the new technology, and state that they believe that every new 
tunnel built in a couple of year’s time will include LED lightning (Wanvik, 2013). Regarding the LED 
lightning, there are several other benefits, such as the possibility to dim the light when no cars are in 
the tunnel and adjusting the lightning in the ends of the tunnel to match the outdoor light.  
The PPP project down south, at E39 Lyngdal-Flekkefjord, has also taken action in order to reduce 
electricity costs. In order to save costs, they used lighter mineral aggregate in order to enable to use the 
natural light to reduce the need for artificial road lightening at dusk and dawn. The contract states that 
the light is set to be at a certain lux value, and the lighter mineral aggregate has contributed to saving 
costs for electricity. This is clearly done in order to optimize the costs for the life cycle of the road 
project. Thus, this is contributing to innovation and more environmental and money saving in 
operation of the roads.  
 Savings in asphalt technology 
From both of the diagrams above, one can also see that pavement maintenance is supposed to be a 
significant post in general operation and maintenance budgets. In order to try to reduce the demand for 
frequent maintenance, the PPP Klett-Bårdshaug made the layer of asphalt just below the abrasion layer 
stronger in order to save costs on that post. From the interview with the representative from this 
project there has been identified that they have now postponed planned pavement maintenance. The 
reason is that it is not necessary to do it now, even though the traffic has increased more than 
forecasted. One of the other PPP projects also reported that strengthening the asphalt quality has saved 
the company costs on that post. However, the change was a little bit different. There the abrasion layer 
was improved with a better chemical mixture in order to stand the tooth of time and cars a little longer. 
According to the interviewee, the improvement has proved cost effective. This show that the 
innovative experiments has proved valuable, and at least should be adapted by the NPRA for test 
sectors at other highways with high traffic volume. 
 Other improvements 
In areas with clay and with high risk of flooding, foundation rocks were placed along with other 
measures to reduce the need for maintenance. In tunnels there are several rooms containing sensitive 
technology and electronic components. The dust that gathers in these tunnels is not something that 
should get near this equipment. These rooms was thus designed with overpressure, making it much 
harder for the dust to get in.  
5.8 CHANGE ORDERS 
When talking to both representatives from the NPRA and from one PPP company one aspect 
mentioned was change orders. In standard operation and maintenance contracts where the duration of 
the contract is much shorter than for the PPP contracts. Changes in the operation standard and other 
similar factors can then be integrated into the new contract, whilst in the PPP contract there is no room 
for new demands. Therefore, if the NPRA finds that some of the new standards are so important, they 
will need to go into negotiations with the PPP company so that there can be a change order where the 
PPP company is compensated for the extra expenditures. Measures that are more likely than others are 
with respect to road safety and lowering the number of traffic deaths.  
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 Interview findings 
Change orders is a natural part of the contracts since they have a lifespan of 25 years. According to all 
the interviewees, change orders have already happened. They have not experienced any problems 
agreeing with the NPRA about the parameters and compensation for these changes. One of the 
interviewees says that it is up to the NPRA to deem which changes are necessary and which are not. 
Some elements might have already been implemented as a measurement for extending the LCC, when 
these measurements are implemented in the operation standard. This can be the case since the PPP 
companies researched what new technologies and solutions might be beneficial for them in the LCC 
perspective and in terms of saving total costs. The type of harder and more durable asphalt, and the 
measures for keeping dust out of sensitive rooms in tunnels might be an example of this, even though 
the project team is uncertain if these measurements are a part of the road standards yet.  
5.9 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND CHALLENGES REGARDING CHANGE 
ORDERS. 
The project owner must have lots of emphasis on thinking of future possible happenings, and 
considering those in the contract formulation. By default, the standards of the time of contract signing 
is valid through the whole contract period, even though the standards are upgraded (Horvli, 2013). For 
example, is the Klett-Bårdshaug sector monitored and supposed to be maintained according to the 
standards of 2003. This means that the requirement for rut depth, cutting of grass, ploughing 
regulations etc. follows the 2003 standard through the whole operation period unless there is an 
agreement of upgrading the contract. The long contract period is in this case a major disadvantage in 
cases where unforeseen innovation applies. There is hard to identify all innovation that applies to the 
future, and there is normal that challenges arise in this connection. In general, one can use a matrix to 
define how to cope with changes, presented in the table below. 
 Table 20, Overview of technological innovation scenarios and how to deal with them 
 
The challenges here arises when the innovation is identified as an upper right corner innovation. An 
example of the challenges regarding this is the administrative monitoring of all maintenance and 
operation contracts in Norway. Through the program “ELRAPP” who was introduced in late 2007, 4 
years after the agreement of the PPP Klett-Bårdshaug. ELRAPP is a way of having a uniform 
monitoring of maintenance contracts. By not having this implemented in the PPP contract, the NPRA 
is forced to have an extraordinary way of monitoring this over the rest of the lifespan of the contract, 
as well as experiencing challenges towards the National Audit Office, because of the lack of proof of 
monitoring (Øien, 2013). Other challenges identified as technological innovation, is introduction of 
DAB radio and emergency communication in tunnels and new standards for road markings (Fuglset, 
2014).  
Foreseen innovation, NPRA responsible Unforeseen innovation, a need for negotiations 
Foreseen innovation 
Choose to do nothing; Steady-state 
Foreseen innovation, PPP responsible 
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From the project’s point of view, the need for upgrading these standards are subject to the cost versus 
risk of not having the upgrade. However, there is also clear that the contract formulation encourage the 
PPP company to implement such innovation, through the bonus scheme for traffic safety and 
availability. In such way, the public has kept the premium for safety and having good quality as a 
strong incentive to make the PPP operator having high emphasis on safety measures. This scheme is 
clearly a good way of encouraging the private operator to conduct changes that contributes to saving 
lives and keeping the road open.  
5.10 TRAFFIC PROGNOSIS AND MAINTENANCE COST CALCULATIONS 
The data obtained and used is presented in the empirical data chapter. In the following paragraphs, 
different findings about maintenance and operation of the PPP Orkdalsvegen will be presented and 
analysed.  
 Additional way of measuring traffic and traffic increase premium  
During this project, there is identified that traffic prognosis is used to calculate whether an extra 
premium should be granted to the operator of the road. The contract agreement states that the average 
of the three latest measuring points is used as forecast comparison. In addition, the junctions along the 
road combined with the traffic data measured from the NPRA is used to find out how many cars that 
are using the different parts of the road. The total road sector is 26,9 kilometres. In total, there are four 
measuring points when including the one at Øysand. Each measuring point is representing a main 
junction. Because a vehicle cannot exit the road other places than these junctions these data are very 
reliable, even though there are two extra junctions. One of the junctions are located right after the 
beginning of the road, in front of the first measuring point. The other junction is located at 
Thamshavn, after all the tunnels, and is in reality a second option exit for Orkanger, in addition to the 
roundabout at Bårdshaug. The traffic lost from these two junctions are believed to be negligible in the 
maintenance cost perspective in this project. In addition, it is worth to mention that these two junctions 
represent the start and finish of the 21,9 km sector of new road for the PPP project.  Thus, it is possible 
to measure the volume of cars using the different percentages of the road.  
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Table 21 Model of additional way of measuring traffic 
 
 
As presented in the tables below, every part of the road is given a percentile of the total, and add all 
these numbers in order to get the correct percentile number of traffic. This is done this to show a 
different way of measuring, where the factual use of the road is even better illustrated. A challenge 
related to measuring this way arise if parts of the road sector differences much between each other, for 
example a sector with a long tunnel continued with a sector of straightforward road in the day up in a 
relatively flat terrain. Then there are big difference between the sectors, and the value for each of the 
road parts should be given a maintenance factor. However, on this sector, the tunnels along the road 
are relatively evenly distributed, with the longest part of tunnels being in the longest sector of the road 
(Børsa-Bårdshaug). However, there is no tunnels in the first sector, but a relatively long bridge. The 
bridges also are relatively evenly distributed. In this example, one can also discuss whether one should 
get extra payment for increased traffic on the area where the road only is upgraded, not constructed 
from the bottom. The project group feel this it is fair to include, because the PPP company has the 
maintenance responsibility there as well. In the table below, some of the values for the 25-year period 
are shown. 
By having this alternative way of measuring, it is also present a different way to calculate maintenance 
cost. As presented in the empirical data chapter, only the three last measuring points are used as basis 
(utvalg)
Measuring 
point Øysand
Brekktunn
elen
Mansfjellt
u-nnelen Storsand Total
Percent of 
the total 
road stretch 
(from Klett, 
26,8 km) 17 % 11 % 24 % 48 % 100 %Finish point 
of sector 
(Meters 
from Klett 4511 7563 13878 26839 26839
Measuring 
point (mtrs 
from Klett 
roundabout) 2898 5188 10388 20268
Percentile 
calculation 
Traffic 
prognosis 
E39, from 
contract.
prognosis + 
20 %
Extra 
payme
nt?
2005 6904 9705 8251 7894 6313 7475 8285 no
2010 7563 10885 9275 8774 7176 8414 9076 no
2015 8480 12148 10519 9810 8066 9441 10176 no
2020 9447 13377 11887 10839 9123 10556 11336 no
2025 10280 14731 13433 11976 10318 11804 12336 no
2030 11173 16221 15179 13233 11670 13202 13408 no
extra: 0
Forecasted traffic by us
percentile taken into 
account
Measured traffic from NPRA
Prognosis from PPP contract
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for calculating the prognosis. By doing that, the NPRA has agreed upon a good deal for themselves, 
because the part of the road with highest traffic, Klett-Øysand, is not included in the calculations. 
There may be several reasons for that, probably mainly because of that the sector is in general 
upgraded existing road. In addition, the road sector only include road in the day and a bridge, and was 
maybe seen as an easy sector to operate. However, there is chosen to illustrate how this works would 
have impact in practice.  By using the model made for analysing the maintenance cost, there is 
measured different costs from the different parts of the road in order to show if the correlation between 
the costs are better with the alternative way of measuring. As visible can see from the table 22 below, 
the total sector length is 17 % of the road, and uses 13 % of the maintenance budget. 
It is important to remember that this way of measuring traffic should take into account how the traffic 
volume is distributed through the total road parcel.  
Table 22, Maintenance costs compared to road sectors 
Contribution to total: 
 Total maintenance 
cost over PPP 
lifespan (25 yrs.), 
2013 value 
Per cent of 
total 
maintenance 
cost 
Contribution in 
traffic forecast 
calculation 
stretch 
per cent 
of total 
road 
length 
Klett-Øysand  kr    46 417 311  13 % 0 % 17 % 
Øysand-Buvik junction  kr    52 149 413  15 % 33 % 11 % 
Buvik junction-Børsa junction  kr    94 502 458  27 % 33 % 24 % 
Børsa junction- Bårdshaug  kr  156 379 828  45 % 33 % 48 % 
total  kr  349 449 010  100 % 100 % 100 % 
 
As the table shows, there is a high correlation between sector length and the contribution to 
maintenance costs from the different sectors.  The model describing this correlation gives an 
interesting view. Although there are no tunnels on the sector Klett-Øysand, there are a bridge, which 
contribute to increasing the maintenance costs. The correlation between road length and maintenance 
cost are very comparable and do not have a severe deviation from the conceptual costs found by the 
model. The calculation model shows that the percentage of the road is not used as basis for 
maintenance costs. As these data are based on the report by ViaNova, it does not represent this road 
sector specifically, but any road sector that somehow can compare itself to this. For later projects, the 
project can see that the correlation is high enough in this project to recommend the method for later 
projects. 
One important point is worth mentioning in this connection, and that is the correlation of traffic on the 
traffic and the road stretch. There should be a correlation between these, which is easy to identify 
using historical figures, to see whether the way of measuring is feasible. 
5.11 OTHER FACTORS   
 Duration of contracts 
In question five of the questionnaire, where the question was how the length of today’s contracts were 
perceived, the majority of the respondents answered between good and that they should be longer. The 
TP representatives were the ones that answered that the contracts should last longer, whilst the PPP 
representatives mostly answered that they were good today, though one of the NPRA representative 
responsible for a PPP project wanted it to be shorter. When talking with people at the NPRA and Ivar 
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Horvli especially, they indicated that this was something the NPRA was aware of, and that these 
people at least were thinking of the possibility to make a bit longer lasting contracts.  
 Supervision  
In the questionnaire there were two questions surrounding the topic of supervision. With the varying 
results, this topic was necessary to include in the interviews. From the interviews, it is said that when 
it comes to the building phase of the PPP projects, there is a clear difference from traditional projects. 
Where the NPRA has around 40 representatives supervising the building process in a traditional 
contract, there were four representatives in the PPP projects.  
In the maintenance phase, the amount of supervision was perceived as a bit more intensive than for 
traditional projects. The arguments from the PPP representatives on this was that it is clear that the 
NPRA is eager to keep track of the quality of the road, installations and other factors that can impact 
the scoring system. Firstly, to check that what the PPP company is reporting is the truth, but also to 
keep track of what they eventually will take control over, so they have an overview when the time 
comes that they will be responsible for the maintenance.  
One of the interviewees says that with the focus they (the PPP company) have on their own sub-
contractors, is clear that possible problems often are brought to their attention before the NPRA are 
aware of it. Their focus on quality of service, and the fact that this is in their own interest makes for a 
trusting relationship with the NPRA, meaning that the NPRA can use more of their time on the 
conventional contracts under their supervision.  
 The financial model 
One of the representatives from a PPP company mentions the financial model as one of the not so god 
aspects of the PPP project. With this, he meant the big expense of paying the interest rate on the loans. 
The felt that with the new government and what they have been saying about the public financing is a 
god step. With a smaller percentage of loans, and a bigger percentage of public financing, it would be 
possible to have the same project at a lower cost.  
Other representatives from PPP companies have to some extent mentioned the interest rates as a 
problem as well, but there is an aspect to take into account here, and that is that two of the project have 
a flat payment structure, whilst the third has a three-step plan. The representative that mentioned the 
financing as a drawback came from one of the projects with a flat payment plan.  
 
5.12 COMPARISON OF MONITORING OF OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 
In general, it seems like the incentives regarding maintenance and operation in the PPP is working 
very well. The deduction points is a clear incentive to not default the contract, and the demand for 
documentation from the PPP company enables the NPRA to have a close monitoring of the situation. 
As well is high quality in general said to be an advantage, because of the ownership the PPP company 
has to the road. Not keeping the quality up to date only comes back to themselves, and slowly tearing 
the quality of the road, which is forcing the owner to take other (probably more expensive) actions in 
order to keep the road according to standards. One of the interviewees from the PPP draws clear lines 
between this collaboration in connection with the maintenance monitoring on the PPP roads. The main 
reason, who was used for this, was that the PPP company also has to monitor their subcontractor 
responsible for operation. In normal contracts, the penalties comes if the NPRA reveal lack of 
functional requirements, for example too much snow, too icy and so on during winter. The monitoring 
is the only incentive the companies has, because the operator of the road itself has no ownership for 
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the sector. In such cases, which also is confirmed from the questionnaire, the quality of the road would 
have been better with higher measuring from the road owner. 
5.13 TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE PUBLIC TO THE PRIVATE 
On questions regarding the need for monitoring in the PPPs, all the interviewees says that the need for 
monitoring is decreased in both the construction and operation phase. When also including thoughts 
about the slowly aging engineers in the public and the lack of young blood to take over when they are 
becoming seniors, a solution to this arises through PPP. Regarding need for labour, the PPP contracts 
can help the public in the lack of qualified labour. Following the findings in the interviews, the public 
commitment to the private projects are lower, because of the private responsibility for the roads. It is 
very early to conclude with anything on this point, but if the lack of public engineers become real, 
using more PPPs may be a way of solving this challenge. A challenge related to this will be the 
possibilities that small construction companies face with lower volume of tendering competitions from 
the public. Many regard the public procurement process as cumbersome, but fair. With larger projects, 
the companies bidding for the project will also be larger, probably the same in many cases, which 
enables them to run hard negotiations towards its own subcontractors, and use other ways of acquiring 
subcontractors than the public system does. 
It is not believed that smaller construction companies will be removed from the market, it is rather so 
that the market for the smaller construction companies will move more towards subcontractor 
assignments in larger PPPs if the scenario become reality. 
5.14 ROAD DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT, AN ATTEMPT AT IMPLEMENTING 
ELEMENTS OF PPP INTO TP 
As a result of the three trial PPP projects, the NPRA decided to attempt at implementing what they 
saw as the positive elements of the PPP. Drastically reduced building time and the increased focus on 
a holistic plan for the whole project, including maintenance costs and LCC, are some of the central 
elements.  
The payment model is not transferred to the road development contract, and the contractors does not 
have the same freedom when it comes to starting the construction on certain elements before all the 
project planes are approved. However, the payment plan is designed with inspiration from the PPP 
projects. The contractor will be paid portions after the completion of certain elements or milestones, 
and at the completion of the building period, the building part of the cost is transferred, with a bonus 
or deductions for improved or delayed building time, and other criteria the NPRA can deduct for 
stipulated in the contract. The availability and traffic flow during the construction period being one of 
these deduction criteria. For the PPP projects, starting the construction whilst some of the planning 
was still going on was one of the elements they used much. Starting the construction of tunnels and 
bridges, which takes the most time could start before the planning surrounding the other roads was 
finished. 
As one of the PPP company representatives’ mention, the fact that the projects are much bigger than 
what is ordinary is in his mind one of the biggest factors leading to shorter building time. This is one 
of the elements that the road development contract does partly adapt, which can give the desired effect 
of reduced construction time.  
 Interview findings 
Incentives such as the construction companies own gain in having expensive machinery at the site for 
a short time ass possible is one of the issues that is mentioned that can lead to shorter building time.  
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In this total enterprise contract the possibility of starting construction whilst some planning is still 
going on is not an option.  
Shorter construction time is listed as one of the issues that can result in a type of bonus. This is 
organised in the manner of the NPRA estimating a mean construction time. As described in the 
interview findings, interviewee 4 gave an example of if the construction mean time is set to 3,5 years. 
The company will get a bonus if it is from 3 till 3,5years, but no bonus for completion earlier than that.  
He did mention an interesting aspect regarding this. He emphasised that there is a breaking point for 
the reduction in construction time, and that there should be a realistic estimate, so that the reduction of 
construction time does not lead to a reduced focus on the health and safety of the workers, the 
breaking of the work environment act and the quality of the solutions. 
One of the elements mentioned in the interview was the selection criteria in the contract. Many of the 
TP contracts only or mainly have a focus on cost. This is not the case for the road development 
contract. In this contract, there are six different criteria, where one naturally is price. Building time, 
environmental issues and mass balance is some of these criteria. The focus on quality solutions and a 
clear vision and complete plan for the project is also valued in the process.  
One extreme issue that can occur is an issue with the payments. There is no finance guarantee from the 
government. This can in an extreme case, where the NPRA does not receive enough funds from the 
government, lead to the defaulting of their payment commitments towards the contractor. In other 
projects, this is solved by using toll money, but in the trial project, there are not that many toll areas.  
The interviewee stresses that this is a very unlikely scenario, but none the less a scenario that can 
occur.  
The competition builds on regulation plans, but the roads are not specified in details, there is more of a 
demanded function, something that the PPP was the inspiration to. When it comes to the use of 
standardisation, the contractors here have the same incentives as the PPP contractors, in the sense of 
reduced construction costs. With the function description, the possibility of standardisation is quite 
real.  
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6 CONCLUSION  
When looking at what elements in the PPP project E39 Klett - Bårdshaug that effect the LCC, several 
factors that can be hard to transfer from PPP to traditional contract forms, including total enterprises 
such as the road development contract is identifiable. The payment model and scheme is something 
you only get with a PPP project, and though the road development contract as taken inspiration for 
their payment model, it is not believed they can expect the same dimension of effect as for the PPP 
contracts. The findings of the project shows that it is reasonable to attribute many of the positive sides 
of PPP to the payment scheme, but also more of the negative sides. However, there is believed that the 
most negative side can to a large degree be solved with the suggestions later in this chapter. The 
measures the PPP company put into place in order to save money on maintenance costs, also leads to a 
lower LCC. The effect of it being a large project with respect to building time is something believed 
the road development contract can obtain to a certain degree, but this has no direct link with LCC. 
Although the road construction manuals are based on much experience regarding road ware, there are 
some elements that the PPP company has implemented which was not listed in the manuals. The 
strengthened asphalt layer has already given results, and there has been no problems with frost 
heaving. It is believed PPP could be even more effective with respects to LCC if the companies could 
more easily implement solutions the NPRA are not aware of, but that has been tested out in other 
countries. This is also something the NPRA should take into account for their traditional contracts.  
As described in the problem statement, there are three main points we wanted to research in this thesis. 
The three points are divided into three sub chapters in the conclusion, with the same sequence as the 
points are presented. As a reminder, the three points are shown below.   
(1) Create an overview over contract details in the three existing Norwegian PPP projects and 
compare it to the traditional contract formulation regarding both construction and later 
operation of the road. The aim is to find a way to describe the governance and payment 
scheme for PPP compared to traditional contracts. 
(2) Consider factors that influences the LCC in the PPP contract E39 Klett-Bårdshaug, and 
evaluate findings with traditional construction and operation contracts. 
(3) If possible, find a conceptual estimate for the LCC at E39 Klett-Bårdshaug, compared to LCC 
for similar road elements (road in the day, bridge, and tunnel) from traditional road 
construction contracts regarding both construction and operation.   
 
6.1 DIFFERENCES IN THE GOVERNANCE AND PAYMENT SCHEME FOR PPP 
COMPARED TO TRADITIONAL CONTRACTS. 
With the financing coming from private banks and investment banks, certain demands and criteria is 
set by them, if they are to agree to a loan. One of the central criteria is having their own technical 
advisor that will keep a watchful eye over the project. The payments are linked up to the fulfilling of 
milestones, and the advisor monitors this progress. This link between milestones and payments, 
together with other project governance criteria is one of the elements the project think helps make the 
PPP projects a success. Since the PPP company is a private company, it is in the project’s minds clear 
that the focus on a profit is a greater motivation than the motivating factors traditional projects are 
governed by. The same goes for the new road development contract. The risk of losing money on 
deductions due to lack of quality or safety standards is not something the PPP companies can live 
with, and this risk is not something the contractors in traditional projects experience. When it comes to 
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the road development contract, it would give a good effect if some of these operational criteria were 
used on their maintenance part of the contract.  
As the analysis shows, there are different ways of organising the payments of a PPP project. The 
model used in the PPP project E39 Klett – Bårdshaug is in this project’s mind the best one, both with 
the possible earnings of the PPP company in mind, but also looking at it from the perspective of a 
taxpayer. If more PPP projects are to be started, with this payment model, the total price can be lower 
than if the payment model was a flat scheme as it is for the other PPP projects. By receiving the 
majority of the contract amount in the payments received the first years, the PPP company is able to 
pay back a big portion of their loans, and in turn lowering their extra costs of maintaining the loan. A 
smaller loan is easier to maintain than a big one. This way of organising the payments might also free 
up capital and make it easier for companies involved in one PPP project continue with a new one. 
For smaller projects, it is not necessarily, given that a PPP project is the best, but looking at 
infrastructure projects with highways, it is a fully viable alternative to traditional contracts and total 
enterprises. 
In the PPP projects, the option of starting the construction of certain elements such as tunnels and 
bridges whilst some other parts of the planning was still going on was used to a large degree. This is 
something thought to be a good help in the respect of reducing construction time. In the traditional 
contracts including the total enterprise and road development contract, this is not an option. 
The NPRA does not allow the start of construction before all the plans for the whole project are 
approved by them. This issue can be a big contributor for the shorter construction time. However, it is 
important to take the aspects regarding too big of a focus on construction time, possibly leading to the 
reduced focus on health and safety among other things, mentioned by the road development contract 
representative.  
The analysis of the elements in the existing PPP contracts and ideas from the interviews has given 
ideas about some changes to future PPP in Norway. Combining the payment plan used for E39 Klett – 
Bårdshaug with a bigger portion of public financing will reduce the cost of PPP, but keep the 
advantages it creates. If the loans are all paid back within the first few years of operation, the extra 
cost of paying interest rates will be much lower than today, but the project still gains the advantages 
that comes from the demands set by the investment banks. The project are of the opinion that demands 
work better that if the NPRA would try to do something similar. This way the projects take the 
advantages with private corporations and their need for structure and profit.  
The scale of the project is an element that is also positive with the PPP projects. Because of this, the 
NPRAs road development contract has larger enterprises than what is normal for traditional 
construction contracts. Combined with longer lasting maintenance portions in the same contract, it will 
be interesting to see whether these projects get the same results as the PPP projects. Both with reduced 
construction time and increased focus on LCC and maintenance. If this project will be cheaper than the 
project estimate or if it follows the trend of budget overruns from other traditional projects. By not 
having the finance incentive, with both the delayed payment, and the demands for governance put 
forward by the banks, it will be hard to get the same results regarding the same amount of construction 
time reduction, but several of the other factors such as quality can be achieved.    
6.2 FACTORS INFLUENCING LCC 
In the problem statement formulation, the focus was aimed most at the factors influencing the Klett-
Bårdshaug. However, during the period of the thesis, the group revealed that different optimizing 
factors was used in all the trial PPP projects. Thus, factors from all the projects is given emphasis 
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during the work. By the analysis of the projects, there has been revealed that the companies did several 
changes in order to optimize the LCC of the road. The main examples is found in asphalt technology, 
where all three projects chose to make a kind of modernisation in order to save costs. The most 
interesting point in this analysis, was that all three projects did changes in the asphalt, but with 
different mission and in different ways. Both electricity savings and slower tearing of the abrasion 
layer has been used as reason for upgrading the pavement. 
Regarding lightning, Orkdalsvegen has now implemented LED lightning in some tunnels, and estimate 
to save 200 000 kWh during a year. If all road lighting could be changed to LED, the savings for the 
public will be huge. The NPRA is also aware of this lightning technology, and plan to implement this 
to all new road sites in a couple of years. One of the large challenges for the NPRA in general, is the 
lag of upgrading old road parcels, and it is believed to take many years before all lightning is 
upgraded. At least 20, as the lifetime of a light bulb may reach that age. As PPP projects has more 
focus on saving costs during operation, it is believed that LED lightning will be implemented faster at 
those projects. 
Orkdalsvegen also built a the longest tunnel 160 meters longer in order to reduce risk of landslides, 
which is regarded as a rather major modernisation of the original road plan. 
 The conclusion to this point must be that there are, according to the PPP companies, costs to save by 
having a longer period than the initial cost. The results are not visible to the project now, even not for 
the operators of the road. Although all see positive, economic sides already. Anyways, there should 
not be made clear conclusions on this point before even more years in operation has passed. The 
reason is that one should see if other factors influence the changes with more years in operations. 
Least, the factual cost savings will not be able to identify before the end of the contract period. 
Finding the right discount rate to use in order to find a best possible value for the total project was also 
important. In this project, 4,5 % was used because the discount rate had been used at other similar 
occasions, and was chosen and identified as the best suited rate. 
6.3 CONCEPTUAL ESTIMATE 
On this measure, finding conceptual estimates for the E39 Klett-Bårdshaug was focus. As described 
earlier, there was no possibility of finding the data needed for a comparison of construction costs. 
However, reliable and valid data was found at the maintenance part regarding standardised contract for 
the NPRA, and the project made conceptual estimate for the maintenance cost for the project over the 
whole operation period. The cost, which is found to be just below 350 million NOK (2013 value) 
show an estimate if the road costs with NPRA maintenance standards. From the paragraph above, it is 
clear that the improvements the PPP company did, should make the maintenance budget lower. As the 
analysis show, they had focus on the most cost consuming budget posts, by for example trying to 
optimize the electricity costs and pavement costs. When constructing the bridge, the PPP company 
also used a standardized wagon, which somehow has helped reducing the total LCC through saving 
costs for hire of multiple wagons.  
The conceptual estimate also revealed that the correlation between the traffic of the different sectors of 
the road and the expenses for maintenance had high correlation. In the contract, only the traffic of the 
last three sectors was used as calculation for traffic forecast, even though the cost estimate revealed 
that the contribution the maintenance costs was relatively evenly distributed over all four stretches. In 
future, the calculations in this thesis show that the costs can be weighted with traffic volumes for the 
different road sectors. 
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The calculations also confirm normal the higher maintenance costs for tunnels. This is of course 
natural, as all figures used are general numbers based on experience in existing projects. In this 
project, the tunnels stand for 40 % of the road length and 55 % of the expenses. The same can be said 
about bridges, even though the variation for bridge maintenance costs are high, and total length is 
relatively short for the total road parcel. They neither are affected by traffic volume in the calculations. 
Standing for 3 % of the road length, they contribute to 14 % of the total maintenance costs, 4,5 times 
higher than length. 
6.4 FURTHER WORK 
As the PPP projects go on, and enter their final phase, and eventually the transferral of the road into 
the ownership of the NPRA, it will be interesting, and necessary to take a new and more thorough look 
at the results and status of the road and the project. As the contract goes on, it will be interesting to see 
if the companies experience more positive effects of the measures taken with respect to quality. With 
the new government, the possibility of new PPP projects has increased. If new projects emerge, it 
would be interesting to see how they are organised compared to the existing ones. If they continue 
with the same financing, and if the bidding process is made shorter and less resource consuming.  
 Financial comparison   
In this project, there has been hard to obtain factual construction costs. It proved so hard it is not part 
of the project because of business matters and lack of updated data from the NPRA. However, the 
digital database where the NPRA are storing costs is useful in the matters, because very detailed 
information of all parts of new road construction projects will be obtainable from that as reference in 
future comparisons. At the time, the roads that can compare itself to the E39 Klett-Bårdshaug is either 
too old to be reported in the database, or there are not reported data for similar sectors. In this project, 
the only available data was a reference sector in a total different geographical area. The road standard 
followed for this sector was also of another quality than the PPP Klett-Bårdshaug. 
This implies that the foundation for a good comparison of data is present if the utilization of the Cost 
Database is used as reference in the future, and can with combination of the maintenance cost report 
perform a cost analysis like the one who is performed for maintenance only in this project. 
 Results from the road development contract compared to PPP 
With the NPRA’s making of the road development contract, it will be a natural continuation of this 
thesis to do a comparative analysis of this project compared with the PPP projects, where some of the 
ideas are gathered. Looking at the construction time, and what measures were taken in the construction 
to reduce maintenance costs will give a clear picture of what measures actually have an influence on 
the construction time, and on the quality. A general view when the project has been finished for a few 
years will be enough to get a general look, but a deeper study with the standard costs will give an even 
better view.  
 Work for the NPRA 
The NPRA should use the cost estimates developed for the maintenance of the PPP project, and 
compare this estimate to the factual numbers. These numbers should also be seen in comparison to 
similar projects, which were one of the intentions of this project. As mentioned earlier, with the new 
focus on PPP, the NPRA should also look at what elements they would like to keep, and which to 
change for future PPP projects.  
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